






The world economy last year expanded somewhat
faster than 2005. Economic dynamism shifted from
the US towards Europe. After approximately three
years of continued high growth, the US economy
started to cool down markedly in 2006. As a conse-
quence, the world economy has surpassed its peak
and will decelerate somewhat during the next few
months. The present slowdown of world economic
growth will be temporary and quite modest. Partly
due to the real depreciation of the dollar, US eco-
nomic growth will start to speed up again from the
second half of 2007 onwards. 
The economic recovery in the European Union con-
tinued to gain pace last year. With a rate of 2.9 per-
cent, the EU recorded the highest GDP growth since
2000. Output in the EU is expected to grow by 2.2 per-
cent in 2007 and 2.5 percent in 2008. The growth gap
between Europe and Japan, on the one hand, and the
United States, on the other, will almost disappear this
year.
The recovery of the European economy is largely
driven by domestic demand. In 2006, private con-
sumption increased notably almost everywhere.
Improved labour market conditions and higher
wages will further stimulate private consumption.
Foreign demand began to show a somewhat weaker
development during the second half of 2006. This
will continue during the first part of 2007 and lead
net exports to contribute negatively to GDP growth
in 2007. In 2008, the stronger world economy will
reverse this. 
A topic that is regularly being discussed among ECB
watchers is the stabilisation policy cost for individual
countries of having a common monetary policy. This
almost per definition implies that monetary policy is
inappropriate for some countries. This chapter pro-
vides stress indicators whose evolution over time
shows how adequate the single monetary policy has
been over the past eight years for each of the EMU
member countries. Especially Ireland and Germany
stand out for different reasons. Whereas Ireland
shows the highest levels of overall stress and mostly
would have preferred to have had higher interest
rates, Germany suffered from too high rates.
Furthermore, especially Germany appears to have
received a lower political weight in monetary policy
decisions of the ECB than suggested by its economic
weight.
2. The current situation 
2.1 The global economy
With a growth rate of 5.1 percent for world GDP, the
world economy last year expanded almost as fast as in
2004, the year of the highest growth since 1973. This
was due to both structural and business cycle reasons.
The trend growth rate of world GDP is, with roughly
4 percent during this decade, about one percentage
point higher than during the 1990s. Especially the
integration of fast growing emerging regions like
China, India, Russia and Eastern Europe into the
world trading system has brought this about. On top
of that, the world economy in 2006 was in a global
upswing for the third year in a row.
World GDP growth was able to keep its high pace
due to high company profits, booming asset markets
and low long-term interest rates. The oil price
increase during the first part of 2006 restrained
growth only marginally. In August, the price of
crude oil reached a new record of 78 US dollars per
barrel. It then sank to a level below 60 dollars at the
end of 2006. The price increase substantiated the
fears that investments of oil-producing countries to
increase their oil supply were insufficient and that
supply in the Near East remained insecure due to
political tensions. The subsequent fall in the oil price
indicates though that these fears have receded over
time.As Figure 1.1 shows, the Ifo Economic Climate
Indicator for the world captures the dynamics of the
world economy very well. Although this indicator fell
during the second half of 2006, it is still well above its
long-run average. The fall in the indicator is only due
to reduced confidence with respect to future econom-
ic developments. The assessment of the current situa-
tion has been improving for five consecutive quarters
now. The indicator therefore suggests that the world
economy has just surpassed its peak and will deceler-
ate somewhat during the next few months. 
2.2 United States 
During 2006, economic dynamism shifted from the
US towards Europe. After approximately three years
of continued high growth, the US economy started to
cool down markedly after the first quarter of last
year. During the last three quarters of 2006, annu-
alised quarter-to-quarter growth rates of real GDP
have been on average below 3 percent after having
been at an average of 3.8 percent over the preceding
twelve quarters. Mainly domestic factors seem to have
caused this slowdown of the US economy. Due to an
outstanding first quarter, US GDP growth in 2006
nevertheless reached 3.4 percent (after 3.2 percent in
2005). 
The successive increase in short-term interest rates
since June 2004 has dampened the real estate market.
The boom in the US residential property market,
which lasted until the end of 2005, was an important
cause of high demand growth in previous years.
Strong increases in residential prices since 2003
enabled households to reach consumption levels
exceeding their current income
for quite some time. Further-
more, since the beginning of 2002
the strong increase in residential
investments has by itself con-
tributed on average 1/2 percentage
point to overall annual GDP
growth. The strong increase in
domestic demand and the large
share of the US in world demand
made the US the growth engine
of the world economy. The long
expected cooling down of the US
real estate market last year led to
a slowdown of its economy; the
effects are already being felt by
large parts of the rest of the
world.
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), residential investment already started to de-
crease during the winter of 2005/2006. Especially
from the second quarter of 2006 onwards, the decline
has been quite pronounced. Accelerating growth in
equipment and software investment as well as in
industrial construction since the winter of 2005/2006
was not able to fully compensate for this. Due to
increased firm profits and capacity utilisation rates,
firms still report a high willingness to invest. Firms
possess the necessary financial means and harbour
positive sales expectations.
Positive developments in the labour market continued
throughout 2006. According to household survey
data, employment increased on average by 2.2 percent
over the year. The unemployment rate has been falling
continuously since mid-2003 and reached 4.5 percent
by the end of last year. As a consequence, substantial
wage increases occurred during the second half of
2006. Nominal wages in the business sector grew by
7 percent in 2006, which is more than during the new
economy boom. In real terms, wages grew by 4 per-
cent as at the end of the last millennium. 
Despite the cooling down of real estate markets, pri-
vate consumption again increased by more than dis-
posable income in 2006. Hence, the savings ratio (per-
sonal savings as a percentage of disposable personal
income), which turned negative during the first half
of 2005, became even more negative (– 1.3 percent in
the third quarter of 2006). However, with an annual
rate of increase of 3.1 percent, consumption did grow
at a somewhat slower pace in 2006 than in the pre-
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ceding two years (3.5 percent in 2005 and 3.9 percent
in 2004).
The trade balance contributed positively to US
growth during the first half of 2006. Exports – in par-
ticular those of investment goods, for example air-
planes – expanded strongly at the beginning of the
year. Subsequently, US exports became considerably
less dynamic. In contrast, except for a slowdown in
the second quarter, the growth of imports increased in
2006. Consequently, the current account deficit
increased even further to 6.6 percent of GDP in 2006.
The depreciation of the US dollar by approximately
10 percent during 2006 (see Figure 1.2) has so far
hardly affected the trade balance.
The continued increase in the oil price until the sum-
mer of 2006 resulted in increased
inflationary pressure. At its peak
in June 2006, the rate of CPI
inflation on a year-to-year basis
was 4.3 percent. The subsequent
decline in the oil price made
inflation fall to 2.0 percent in
November 2006. In contrast to
2005, core inflation (that is, the
inflation rate corrected for the
price developments of the
volatile components energy and
food) increased over the year,
reaching a level of 2.9 percent
in September but then fell to
2.6 percent in November and De-
cember 2006. 
The Federal Reserve continued
its policy of gradually raising
interest rates – started in June
2004 – until June last year when
the Federal Funds rate reached
5.25 percent. After that, the signs
of a business cycle slowdown in
the US induced the Federal
Reserve to stop its policy of
interest rate rises.
According to the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), the deficit
of the US federal government
during the fiscal year 2006
(which ended in September) was
reduced by half a percentage
point as compared to 2005 and
amounted to 1.9 percent of
GDP. The most important reasons for this positive
development were related to the business cycle; rev-
enues from income and corporate taxes increased
strongly by 11.8 percent and more than compensat-
ed for the extraordinary expenditure increase by
7.4 percent. The latter was mainly due to increased
energy prices, a substantial rise in public health
expenditures and the costs incurred by the hurri-
canes in the second half of 2005. 2006 expenditures
to finance the US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan
(111 billion US dollars) also clearly exceeded their
2005 level. 
2.3 Japan, China and other Asian countries
As indicated by the World Economic Survey, in Japan
the business cycle recovery continued at a somewhat
Figure 1.2
Figure 1.3slower pace during the second
half of 2006 (see Figure 1.3). In
particular, the reduction in pri-
vate consumption growth con-
tributed negatively to real GDP
growth. The main reasons for
this retardation were a reduction
in the real income of employees
and exceptionally bad weather
conditions in the third quarter –
the quarter of the sharpest
decline.
On the other hand, investment
and exports became the growth
engines. Especially private invest-
ment expanded strongly after
having experienced only small
increases in 2005. The increase in
private investment by four percent last year was sup-
ported by higher firm profits. Increased exports and
subdued imports made the balance contribute
0.8 percentage points to real GDP growth in 2006.
According to preliminary estimates, real GDP growth
will probably be 2.1 percent in 2006 (after 1.9 percent
in 2005). As nominal GDP growth lies below the real
growth rate, there still appears to be some deflation in
terms of prices of domestically produced goods and
services. Nevertheless, as compared to 2005, the prob-
lem of deflation has become smaller. The Consumer
Price Index – focusing upon domestically consumed
goods and services – even increased by 0.3 percent last
year. Since early 2003, the unemployment rate has
decreased by more than 11/2 percentage points to
4.1 percent in July last year, where it has basically re-
mained since.
In July 2006, the Bank of Japan made its first interest
rate move since September 2001 and thereby signalled
its intention to normalise monetary policy. Since then
the average interest rate on the certificates of deposit
with a maturity of 180 days to one year has been close
to 0.4 percent (see Figure 1.4).
The economic recovery was used by the Japanese
government to reduce government spending, which
is imperative, given the large (gross) public debt of
over 160 percent of GDP (see Figure 1.5). Whereas
government consumption only increased slightly
last year, public investment experienced a strong
decline.
The  Chinese economy continues to grow very
dynamically. On a year-to-year basis, economic
growth in China reached a rate of approximately
101/2 percent last year and there-
by surpassed the upwardly re-
vised figure of 10.2 percent for
2005. Industrial production
growth is high, but rates of
20 percent in early 2006 have
fallen to close to 15 percent at
the end of the year. But then
again, the annual growth rate of
investment remains at around
30 percent. Especially in the
urban areas, construction
investment further increased its
pace. The strong increase in
retail trade sales indicates that
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As growth is driven from the supply side and capacity
continues to increase rapidly, inflationary pressures
remain moderate. The CPI only increased by 1.4 per-
cent during the period from January to November last
year as compared to the same period in 2005. Also
more restrictive monetary policy played a role here.
The Peoples Bank of China raised interest rates for
credits with a maturity of one year two times (in April
and in August) by in total 54 basis points to a level of
6.12 percent. This was followed by other measures to
reduce liquidity in the economy. For instance, the cen-
tral bank enforced higher down payments for mort-
gage loans, issued central bank bills to commercial
banks that have created excessive loans and increased
reserve requirement ratios. 
Exports and imports continued to grow at rates of
roughly 25 and 20 percent respectively. The trade sur-
plus reached 166 billion US dollars or more than eight
percent of GDP in the first three quarters of 2006.
Foreign exchange reserves exceeded the 1 trillion US
dollar mark in October 2006. This made China, with
a share of approximately 20 percent of world reserves,
the country with the highest foreign exchange reserves
in the world. Despite the move towards an exchange
rate regime of managed floating in July 2005, the
resulting pressure to revaluate the renminbi has so far
not induced much action on the part of Chinese
authorities. During last year, only a small apprecia-
tion of slightly more than 3 percent against the US
dollar took place. 
In the other East Asian countries, that is South Korea,
Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and
the Philippines, GDP during the first three quarters of
2006 on average grew by 5 percent in a year-on-year
comparison. In the largest country of this group,
South Korea, a slowdown in growth due to a weaken-
ing of private consumption is notable. Overall, the
economic expansion in the region was driven by
strong export developments. Lower prices of raw
materials, especially oil, during the second half of last
year contributed to moderate price developments. For
that reason no further increases in interest rates
occurred in the region. 
2.4 The rest of the world
With an average annual rate of GDP growth of
4.8 percent, Latin America continued to grow strong-
ly in 2006. The increased raw material prices in the
first half of last year and the associated terms of
trade improvement for many of the countries in the
region was one important cause. Although increased
domestic demand also stimulated imports, the aggre-
gate current account again showed a substantial sur-
plus in 2006. In addition, a less restrictive monetary
policy in central economies like Brazil and Mexico
stimulated investment. Based on increased real
incomes, private consumption expanded as well.
Cyclical developments in Russia remained favourable.
After a slow phase at the beginning of 2006, GDP
growth picked up again, reaching approximately
6.5 percent on a year-to-year basis. In view of the
terms of trade improvements, caused by increased
prices of raw material and expansionary fiscal policy,
domestic demand turned into the driving force of eco-
nomic growth. Private consumption increased by
12 percent in 2006. High capacity utilisation rates
have induced firms to increase investment expendi-
tures since spring last year. Supported by high oil and
gas prices, last year’s government budget surplus
almost reached the same record level of 7.5 percent of
GDP as in 2005. 
High growth in Russia also continued to exert a
favourable influence in the labour market. The unem-
ployment rate fell to 7.0 percent. After high inflation
at the beginning of 2006, inflation pressures were sub-
dued during the rest of the year. The annual rise of
the CPI was 9.5 percent in 2006. This was the first
annual rise below 10 percent since the fall of the Iron
Curtain in 1989.
2.5 The European economy
The economic recovery in the European Union that
started in mid-2003, but lost some momentum during
the winter of 2004/2005, continued to gain pace last
year. With a rate of 2.9 percent, the European Union
recorded the highest GDP growth since 2000.
Annualised quarter-to-quarter GDP growth rates
reached a peak of 3.9 percent in the second quarter of
last year. As also indicated by the Ifo World Eco-
nomic Survey, the second half of the year showed
somewhat weaker growth (see Figure 1.6). This some-
what reduced growth was mainly due to developments
in France, Germany and Italy. The British and
Spanish economies continued to grow at similar rates
as during the first half of 2006.
Overall, macroeconomic developments in the EU
were more uniform during the last few years as com-
pared to the 1990s or the first years of the new mil-
lennium. Nevertheless, growth differentials continuedto exist. These were mainly due to different develop-
ments in private consumption and residential con-
struction, and to a lesser extent to differences in trade
and business investment. In the somewhat faster
growing economies like Ireland, Spain and the UK,
rising prices in property markets gave rise to wealth
effects stimulating private consumption. Consumer
credit expanded strongly and the savings rate of pri-
vate households declined. Further expected increases
in real estate prices also stimulated residential invest-
ment in these economies. 
The recovery in the European economy was largely
driven by domestic demand (see Figure 1.7). With the
exceptions of Germany, the Netherlands and Por-
tugal, private consumption increased significantly
everywhere, mostly reaching growth rates well above
2 percent in 2006. Even in Germany, where private
consumption basically stagnated
since 2002, it grew by 0.6 percent
last year. 
A second important pillar of
demand growth last year was pri-
vate investment. Continued low
long-term interest rates and im-
proved firm profits led to further
increases in growth of both resi-
dential investment and invest-
ment in machinery and equip-
ment. However, deteriorated out-
looks for the world economy
started to restrain the willingness
to invest somewhat during the
second half of last year.
Not only investment but also foreign demand in the
EU began to show a somewhat weaker development
during the second half of the year. Nevertheless,
exports grew strongly in 2006 by a rate of 8.5 percent.
However, as imports also grew strongly, the trade bal-
ance only improved marginally (see Figure 1.8). 
Accelerating employment growth, especially during
the first semester, helped reduce the unemployment
rate to 7.9 percent in both the EU and the euro area
in 2006. Especially in Poland, Denmark, Germany,
France and Spain, the reductions were substantial.
The UK was the only EU country where the unem-
ployment rate increased significantly in 2006. Al-
though at the same time employment increased, it was
insufficient to absorb the even bigger rise in the UK
labour force due to migration (mainly from Eastern
Europe) and increased labour force participation. 
Measured by the harmonised
consumer price index, headline
inflation in the EU reached a
peak of 2.4 percent in June last
year (see Figure 1.9). After that,
it fell back to 2.1 percent in No-
vember, as energy prices started
falling. Inflation, excluding price
changes for energy and unpro-
cessed food, steadily increased to
a rate of 1.5 percent during the
year; Headline inflation in 2006
ended up at the same rate as the
year before: 2.2 percent. 
Overall, wages rose somewhat




Figure 1.7EEAG Report 21
Chapter 1
two preceding years (see Tab-
le 1.1). But with a nominal
growth rate of 1.9 percent (com-
pared to an average growth rate
of more than 4 percent over all
OECD countries), the increase
can still be considered moderate.
As in the previous years, there
were substantial differences
among European countries. In
Germany and in the Netherlands
compensation per employee in
the business sector only rose by
0.6 and 1.6 percent, respectively.
At the other end of the scale, in
Hungary and in Poland, nominal
wages increased by 5.8 and
4.7 percent, respectively.
In Germany, unit labour costs
have risen by less than in most
other European countries since
the mid-1990s. The implied real
exchange rate depreciation has
led to expansionary impulses
from foreign trade and has been
important for improving the eco-
nomic outlook for the country.
Developments in Germany fol-
lowed a similar course as earlier
developments in the Netherlands
and Denmark, which both opted
successfully for a strategy of real
depreciation via wage modera-
tion in the 1980s.1 In Sweden and
Finland nominal exchange rate
depreciation also induced export-
led growth in the past (see
Chapter 4 of this report). 
On the other hand, Italy’s and
Portugal’s relative unit labour
costs within the EU have in-
creased markedly. This explains
why expansionary impulses from
foreign trade have been lacking
there for several years. For these
countries, the loss of the ex-
change rate instrument in the
monetary union could not – as
hoped – be compensated by in-
Figure 1.8
Figure 1.9
1 See Section 5.3 in Chapter 4 of this re-
port for a discussion of the Danish case.creased nominal wage flexibility. In a similar vein, the
macroeconomic adjustment problems in Spain and
Greece can at least partly be related to past real ex-
change rate appreciations within the euro area. 
2.6 Fiscal and monetary policy
Fiscal policy
For Europe as a whole, fiscal policy in 2006 was char-
acterised by an aggregate budget deficit of 2.0 percent
of GDP (see Table 1.2) as compared to 2.3 percent in
2005. This reduction is largely due to a stronger cycli-
cal development than expected. The improved busi-
ness cycle conditions over several quarters have led to
higher firm profits and higher wage incomes, which
both have increased government revenues. Firm prof-
its have increased even more than what is usual in
upswings. Despite the improved business cycle condi-
tions, leading to in particular lower welfare spending,
overall government expenditures increased slightly in
most countries. 
Whereas in 2005 the Czech Republic, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Portugal, the Slovak
Republic and the United Kingdom all had budget
deficits above the Maastricht ceiling of three percent
of GDP, at least Germany and Greece managed to
stay below this level in 2006. The fiscal policy stance
differed substantially among European countries.
Whereas the stance in Portugal turned quite restrictive
last year, fiscal policy in some other countries like
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland – not faced
with substantial budgetary problems in the medium
run – became somewhat more expansionary in 2006.
In Italy, the general government budget deficit
increased to 4.7 percent from 4.1 percent of GDP in
2005. The explanation was a one-off refund of VAT
receipts amounting to 0.9 percent of GDP.
Monetary conditions and financial markets
The ECB has since December 2005 increased its main
refinancing rate in six steps by in total 1.5 percentage
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EURO 2003–05 1.6 – 0.4 0.6 1.3 5.1 na
2006 1.9 0.2 1.2 0.9 – 1.1 na
DE
g) 2003–05 0.6 – 0.2 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 1.1
2006 0.6 – 0.1 2.0 – 1.5 – 4.0 1.0
FR 2003–05 3.2 1.4 1.2 1.6 3.6 – 4.9
2006 3.0 1.3 1.3 1.7 0.2 – 1.4
IT 2003–05 2.0 – 0.7 – 0.3 3.5 4.6 – 6.8
2006 3.4 1.3 0.2 3.7 2.7 – 4.6
FIN 2003–05 3.1 2.8 2.1 1.1 3.0 – 3.6
2006 2.6 1.8 3.7 – 0.6 – 1.9 0.3
NETH 2003–05 1.6 0.1 1.7 0.6 2.9 – 1.3
2006 1.6 0.3 1.9 – 1.0 – 1.6 – 0.7
IRE 2003–05 4.8 2.1 1.4 4.2 5.1 – 2.3
2006 4.5 1.7 0.9 5.0 – 0.3 – 3.7
ESP 2003–05 3.2 – 0.9 0.5 2.9 2.0 – 2.7
2006 2.9 – 0.7 0.7 2.5 0.7 – 2.3
UK 2003–05 3.0 0.4 1.6 2.6 0.2 – 2.5
2006 3.6 1.3 1.7 2.9 1.6 3.8
SWE 2003–05 3.2 1.8 2.8 0.8 – 1.6 0.0
2006 2.9 1.7 2.6 0.0 0.1 – 1.9
POL 2003–05 1.4 – 1.0 3.4 0.2 – 5.8 3.7
2006 4.7 4.1 2.2 2.9 – 0.5 3.6
HUN 2003–05 8.0 4.0 4.2 3.9 1.2 3.8
2006 5.8 2.5 3.7 3.4 – 4.2 3.9
USA 2003–05 3.6 0.9 2.4 1.6 – 5.9 – 2.1
2006 7.1 4.2 1.9 4.3 – 1.2 – 1.0
JAP 2003–05 0.0 1.4 2.1 – 2.6 – 2.5 0.6
2006 0.3 1.3 2.5 – 1.0 – 11.4 0.9
a) Business sector = Total economy less the public sector. – 
b) Nominal wage deflated by GDP Deflator. – 
c) Total economy. –
d) Manufacturing sector. – 
e) Competitiveness– weighted relative unit labour costs in dollar terms. –
f) Difference between growth 
rates of export volumes and export markets for total goods and services. A positive number indicates gains in market shares and a 
negative number indicates a loss in market shares. – 
g) The figures for Germany are compensations per employee and not wages.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 80 database.EEAG Report 23
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This implies an increase of the real short-term interest
rates to close to two percent (see Figure 1.10). The
real effective depreciation of the euro in 2005 was to a
large extent corrected again last year (see
Figure 1.11). This appreciation of the euro implied
more restrictive monetary conditions for the euro area
last year. On the other hand, long-term interest rates
have decreased somewhat since the middle of last
year, coming down from a level of 4.1 percent to
3.9 percent at the end of the year (see Figure 1.12).
But overall, monetary conditions have become tighter
over time.
Despite further increases in oil prices in the first
semester of last year, no signifi-
cant inflation pressure has arisen.
So-called second-round effects
have been very modest. Even in
the service sector, which is in gen-
eral more sheltered from interna-
tional competition than the man-
ufacturing sector, price increases
have been stable. However, as the
economic upswing became more
and more supported by domestic
demand, the risks for medium-
term price stability did increase
over time. 
With a growth rate of about
8 percent on a year-to-year basis,
M3 money supply increased
Table 1.2 
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Gross debt
a) Fiscal  balance
a)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Germany   63.9  65.7  67.9  67.8  67.7  – 4.0  – 3.7  – 3.2  – 2.3  – 1.6 
France   62.4  64.4  66.6  64.7  63.9  – 4.2  – 3.7  – 2.9  – 2.7  – 2.6 
Italy   104.3  103.9  106.6  107.2  105.9  – 3.5  – 3.4  – 4.1  – 4.7  – 2.9 
Spain    48.7  46.2 43.1 39.7 37.0 0.0  –  0.2 1.1 1.5 1.1 
Netherlands   52.0  52.6 52.7 50.5 47.8  – 3.1  – 1.8  – 0.3  0.0  0.1 
Belgium   98.6  94.3 93.2 89.4 86.3  0.0  0.0  – 2.3  – 0.2  – 0.5 
Austria   64.6  63.8 63.4 62.1 60.9  – 1.6  – 1.2  – 1.5  – 1.3  – 1.2 
Greece   107.8  108.5 107.5 104.8 101.0  – 6.1  – 7.8  – 5.2  – 2.6  – 2.6 
Finland    44.3  44.3 41.3 38.8 37.3 2.5 2.3 2.7 2.9 2.9 
Ireland    31.1  29.7 27.4 25.8 24.4 0.3 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.9 
Portugal   57.0  58.6 64.0 67.4 69.4  – 2.9  – 3.2  – 6.0  – 4.6  – 4.0 
Slovenia  28.5  28.7 28.0 28.4 28.0  – 2.8  – 2.3  – 1.4  – 1.6  – 1.6 
Luxembourg   6.3  6.6 6.0 7.4 7.3  0.3  – 1.1  – 1.0  – 1.5  – 0.5 
Euro area  69.2  69.7 70.6 69.4 68.0  – 3.1  – 2.8  – 2.4  – 2.0  – 1.5 
United Kingdom   38.9  40.4 42.4 43.2 44.1  – 3.3  – 3.2  – 3.3  – 2.9  – 2.8 
Sweden    51.8  50.5 50.4 46.7 42.6 0.1 1.8 3.0 2.8 2.4 
Denmark  44.4  42.6 35.9 28.5 24.5 1.1 2.7 4.9 4.0 4.3 
Poland  43.9  41.8 42.0 42.4 43.1  – 4.7  – 3.9  – 2.5  – 2.2  – 2.0 
Czech Republic  30.1  30.7 30.4 30.9 30.8  – 6.6  – 2.9  – 3.6  – 3.5  – 3.6 
Hungary  58.0  59.4 61.7 67.6 70.9  – 7.2  – 6.5  – 7.8  – 10.1  – 7.4 
Slovakia  42.7  41.6 34.5 33.0 31.6  – 3.7  – 3.0  – 3.1  – 3.4  – 3.0 
Lithuania  21.2  19.4 18.7 18.9 19.6  – 1.3  – 1.5  – 0.5  – 1.0  – 1.2 
Cyprus  69.1  70.3 69.2 64.8 62.2  – 6.3  – 4.1  – 2.3  – 1.9  – 1.7 
Latvia  14.4  14.5 12.1 11.1 10.6  – 1.2  – 0.9  0.1  – 1.0  – 1.2 
Estonia  5.7 5.2 4.5 4.0 2.7 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.5 1.6 
Malta  70.2  74.9 74.2 69.6 69.0  – 10.0  – 5.0  – 3.2  – 2.9  – 2.7 
EU25  62.0  62.4 63.3 62.5 61.4  – 3.0  – 2.7  – 2.3  – 2.0  – 1.6 
Romania  21.5  18.8 15.9 13.7 13.9  – 1.5  – 1.5  – 1.5  – 1.4  – 2.6 
Bulgaria  46.0  38.4 29.8 25.8 21.8 0.3 2.7 2.4 3.3 1.8 
a) As a percentage of gross domestic product.  
Source: European Commission. 
Figure 1.10faster than the years before (see Figu-
re 1.13). Last year was the sixth consecutive year in
which M3 growth exceeded the ECB reference value
of 4.5 percent. Credits to firms were one important
cause of this. On a year-to-year basis, firm credits
increased by more than 12 percent during the second
half of last year. However, on a month-to-previous-
month basis, there was a dampening of the dyna-
mism starting in April 2006. Although residential
construction loans continued to increase by double-
digit rates, its rate of increase has been falling since
the beginning of 2006. Consumption credit growth
shows a similar – although somewhat less pro-
nounced – tendency but with a lag of roughly half a
year. 
In the UK, the slowdown in economic growth induced
by a cooling real estate market in 2005 was quickly
overcome. The Bank of England consequently re-
versed its interest rate cut of
August 2005 one year later. In
November 2006, a second interest
rate increase of 25 basis points
was decided. With the surprise
move, for many, of a hike of
another 25 basis points on
11 January this year, the official
bank rate paid on commercial
bank reserves was raised to
5.25 percent. 
Despite robust growth and strong
increases in energy prices, long-
term inflation pressures hardly
appear to be a concern for finan-
cial markets. Except for May and
June, in which there was a sub-
stantial setback, European stock markets rose
throughout 2006 (see Figure 1.14). High profits and
still low interest rates were the driving forces. As in the
past three years, the Euro Stoxx 50 and the German
DAX share indices, with growth rates of approxi-
mately 20 percent, outperformed the Dow Jones,
which gained roughly 15 percent. 
3. The economic outlook for 2007 and 2008
3.1 The global economy
Given the slightly less optimistic expectations as
reported by participants in the Ifo World Economic
Survey, world economic growth is likely to slow down
somewhat during the first half of 2007.
The substantial reduction in eco-
nomic growth in large parts of
the world experienced after 2000
might raise fears that the present
turnaround of the business cycle
will also be a sharp one (see
Figure 1.1). The slowdown at the
time was affected, firstly, by the
rapid increase in energy prices.
Secondly, the central banks in
Western Europe had tightened
monetary policy to stem the dan-
ger of inflation. Last but not
least, the world economy weak-
ened significantly as the boom in
the US came to a sudden end.
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tember caused an additional shock to business and
consumer confidence in the global economy. 
This time around it is not likely that we will see simi-
lar developments. First, the oil price nowadays
appears to move rather pro- than anti-cyclically (see
Figure 1.15 and Chapter 1 of the
2006 EEAG report). Although
further increasing demand will
keep raw material and oil prices
high and volatile, on average, we
assume the oil price will stay
close to 60 US dollars per barrel
over our two-year forecasting
horizon. 
Secondly, interest rates in the
US and in Europe are likely to
have reached or even passed
their peaks. During 2007, we
expect the US Federal Reserve
to decrease its key interest rate
in two steps to a level of
4.75 percent and maintain this
rate until the end of 2008.
Given the still prevalent infla-
tion worries, the first step is not
likely to be taken before the end
of spring. The ECB will leave
the main refinancing rate at its
present level throughout the
forecasting period. 
Finally, geo-political tensions
do not appear to be increasing
at this stage. Hence, most likely
the present slowdown of world
economic growth will be tempo-
rary and quite modest: We
expect world economic growth
slightly below 5 percent both
this and next year, which is
above the trend rate of growth.2
After having grown by 8.5 per-
cent last year, world economic
trade will increase by 7.5 percent
in 2007 and 8 percent in 2008.
We expect that the dollar will
continue to depreciate and at
the end of 2007 reach 1.40 dol-
lars per euro. The average rate
was 1.26 in 2006. At the end of
2006, the euro stood at 1.32. We
see three reasons for a continued depreciation of
Figure 1.13
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2 These growth rates are based on purchasing power parity conver-
sions as done by the IMF. Table A2 in Appendix 1 reports growth
rates using weights based on nominal GDP in US dollars. See IMF
(2003) for more details.the dollar. Firstly, the positive short-term interest
rate differential between the US and the euro area
will become smaller when the Fed starts to cut
interest rates. Secondly, looking at how quickly the
amount of euro coins and notes have increased over
the last few years makes it clear that the euro is
more attractive than its predecessor – the Deutsche
Mark – ever was (see Sinn and Westermann 2005
and Figure 1.16).3 Both arguments imply a relative-
ly less attractive dollar as compared to the euro.
Thirdly, a necessary condition for ultimately resolv-
ing the US current account problem is a deprecia-
tion of the dollar. 
Note that we do not assume a scenario here in which
financial investors suddenly withdraw from the US
and thereby trigger a much sharper depreciation of
the US dollar and most likely ini-
tiate a worldwide recession. On
the contrary, we expect equity
markets to remain stable and a
soft landing of the US, and thus
also the world economy. 
3.2 United States
Initially, the US will continue to
lose growth momentum. Private
investment will be weak through-
out the first half of this year.
Falling residential construction is
mainly responsible for this. As
the number of homes sold started
to stabilise in the second half of
last year, residential investment is
likely to stabilise during the sec-
ond half of this year and 2008.
Recent wage increases and improved labour market
conditions will allow private consumption to continue
to support US growth. This is likely to be the case
despite the negative wealth effects associated with the
cooling off of the housing market. Continued high
growth in machinery and equipment investment will
also cushion the temporary slowdown.
As important trade partners of the US, like Japan and
the EU, will also suffer some temporary fallback in
growth, US exports will first continue to grow at only
a moderate rate. However, the real depreciation of the
US dollar together with improved cyclical conditions
in Japan and the EU will stimulate US exports over
time. Due to the decline in energy prices during the
second half of last year, the value
of imports will initially increase
at a slower pace. The conse-
quence will be a slowly improving
current account situation, with
deficit levels of 6.4 and 6.3 per-
cent of GDP in 2007 and 2008,
respectively. 
Hence, US economic growth will
start to speed up again from the
second half of 2007 onwards.





3 According to the Financial Times
(27 December 2006), the value of euro
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year, GDP will grow by 2.5 percent in 2007 and
2.8 percent in 2008. The unemployment rate will ini-
tially tend to increase somewhat. On average it will
reach 4.9 percent in both 2007 and 2008.
The inflation rate will initially come down due to a so-
called base effect, that is, the price increases due to
earlier oil price increases will cease to affect the year-
on-year inflation rate. After that, and following the
business cycle improvement, inflation will increase
slightly again. On average it will reach 2.7 percent in
2007 and 2.6 percent in 2008. 
For fiscal 2007, the economic slowdown will reduce
government revenues in the US. Furthermore, it is
questionable whether or not the announced budget
cuts will be sufficient to counteract the sharply
increasing health expenditures. Therefore, the US gov-
ernment deficit will increase somewhat during 2007
and 2008 to a level of approximately three percent of
GDP in 2008. 
3.3 Japan, China and other Asian countries
In Japan, increased firm profits and a tightening of
the labour market will improve household incomes
this year. This will stimulate private consumption
considerably. The slowdown of the world economy
will reduce export growth and investment. Also, rein-
forced fiscal consolidation efforts will result in a neg-
ative growth contribution from public spending (see
Figure 1.17). Overall, GDP will grow by 2.0 percent
this year. A small increase in both consumer and pro-
ducer prices will induce the Bank of Japan to gradu-
ally tighten its monetary policy by raising interest
rates. Improved business-cycle conditions in the US
will stimulate Japanese exports in 2008 and allow
GDP to then grow by 2.2 percent.
It is still the objective of the Chinese government to
decrease income disparity between rural and urban
areas, which, via lower saving rates, will stimulate
private consumption growth. This together with
strong investment will counteract slower export
growth caused by the world economic slowdown.
GDP growth will slightly decrease to 10 percent per
year. So far, there are no signs that the Chinese
economy is overheating. Inflation will remain some-
where between 1 and 2 percent. Downside risks in
China include an escalation of the trade and
exchange rate disputes with the US and the EU.
Increased Chinese imports following from the
domestic policy to decrease income disparities could
help soften the disputes. 
In the remaining East Asian countries, that is, South
Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore and the Philippines, GDP growth rates in
2007 and 2008 will fall to around 4.5 percent (after
having been 5.2 percent last year). The economic
slowdown in the main trading partner countries and
the somewhat increased political uncertainty in the
region associated with, for instance, North Korean
nuclear armaments are the underlying causes of this. 
3.4 The rest of the world
As compared to last year, the economic expansion in
Latin America will only slow down moderately. GDP
growth will reach 3.8 percent in 2007 and 4.0 percent
in 2008. In Brazil, domestic
demand will be largely supported
by private consumption. Increas-
es in social welfare spending and
in real incomes will more than
compensate for reduced growth
in export demand caused by the
weaker expansion of the world
economy and in particular the
US. In Mexico, such compensat-
ing domestic factors are largely
lacking, implying a fall in growth
from 4.7 percent last year to
3.5 percent in the subsequent two
years.
Over the forecasting period, the
Argentinean economy will also
Figure 1.17slow down. The recovery after the severe economic
crisis in 2002 is coming to an end. Furthermore, in
many areas production is reaching full capacity limits.
Inflation will keep on falling and be 9.5 percent in
2007 and 6.5 percent in 2008. GDP growth will be
around 6 percent in both years (after being close to
8 percent last year).
In Russia, GDP growth is expected to reach 6.0 per-
cent in both 2007 and 2008. Trade will continue to
increase and, as last year, imports will expand more
strongly than exports. Due to the large amount of raw
materials in Russian exports, the actual development
of the trade balance to a large extent depends on price
developments in oil and gas markets. The unemploy-
ment rate will fall somewhat further to 6.4 percent in
2008. Despite continued increases in fiscal spending
and the lower oil prices at the end of last year, we
expect the substantial government budget surplus of
6.5 percent of GDP to only fall slightly. The govern-
ment intends to use the surplus to reduce taxes,
increase infrastructure investment, reform the educa-
tion and health sectors and increase foreign-exchange




The US current account deficit 
In this year’s forecast, we assume that the slowdown of the US economy, together with a moderate but continuous depreciation of
the dollar, will gradually reduce the US trade and current account imbalances. Here, we shortly summarise the arguments put 
forward to explain the large US current account deficit, which stood at 6.6 percent of GDP in 2006, and point out that almost 
independently of the theoretical framework used, a depreciation of the US dollar appears inevitable. As a consequence, the 
European economy would be negatively affected. The Box is a follow-up of Chapter 2 of the 2006 EEAG report. 
The large and still increasing current account deficit of the US is mainly being financed by Japan and China, some European 
countries and to an increasing extent the oil-exporting world. There is now a broad consensus about the following three proximate 
causes of current imbalances.  
• Both private and government savings in the US have fallen over time and imply low total national savings. The asset market 
boom up to 2001 and increasing residential prices since then have created wealth effects that allowed private consumption to 
increase faster than disposable income.  
• The US current account deficit is a mirror image of high savings in the rest of the world and/or low worldwide investment. 
For instance, the increased urge to save for retirement, as current pay-as-you-go systems in many countries are becoming 
unsustainable, might have led to increased savings and thereby low real interest rates.  
• There is a strong preference by investors elsewhere for US assets. One reason might be that markets continue to expect 
sustained high productivity growth in the US. Another explanation is Asian exchange rate policies that hold local currencies 
at artificially low values against the dollar.
a) Finally, political risks in many countries might cause people to instead invest in a 
safe haven like the US. 
These factors together can explain the combination of current account imbalances, the strong dollar, low world real interest rates, 
and the low expected returns on US assets we are observing.
b) While there is considerable debate on the extent to which the 
current pattern of global trade imbalances in general, and the US current account deficit in particular, should be cause for concern, 
there is little doubt that the US cannot run a current account deficit of 6.6 percent of GDP indefinitely. 
By definition, a reduction in the US current account deficit must be accompanied by an increase of US (private and/or public) 
savings relative to that of the rest of the world, that is, spending must increase in the rest of the world relative to the US. The 
implication is a slowdown of the US economy, a realignment of international relative prices, or both. Hence, all scenarios 
involving a narrowing of the US trade deficit are characterized by a depreciation of the dollar in real effective terms. 
Looking at the fairly small bilateral trade volumes of Europe with the US, one could get the impression that the direct 
macroeconomic impact of a slowdown (or a switch in expenditures away from imports towards domestically produced goods) in 
the US on Europe through the trade channel would be small. However, an inspection of bilateral trade volumes understates the full
impact of the trade channel. US and European firms compete in third markets, and an expansion in US exports triggered by a 
dollar depreciation would pose a competitive threat to European exporters. Furthermore, trade relations between the US and EU 
member countries differ substantially. These asymmetries in trade patterns imply that not all countries would be affected to the
same extent. 
In addition to trade linkages, the weakening of the US dollar would have a non-negligible negative wealth effect on European 
investors by reducing the value of their dollar-denominated claims.
c) There is considerable heterogeneity across Europe both in 
terms of net asset positions and financial holdings in the United States. Accordingly, to the extent that a correction of global
imbalances produces a shift in the financial environment (for example an increase in world interest rates), as well as in US asset 
values and the euro-dollar exchange rate, this probably will have differing effects across Europe.  
a) As discussed in Chapter 2 of the 2006 EEAG report, the cause might be the desire of Asian countries to follow a path of export-led growth and to 
build up foreign exchange reserves for precautionary reasons. In this way they hope to avoid situations like those that occurred in the Asian crisis of 
1997–98. 
b) For more discussion, see, for instance, Bernanke (2005), Blanchard et al. (2005), Caballero et al. (2006) or Chapter 2 of the 2006 EEAG report. 
c) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) estimate the impact of currency realignments on net external positions using different scenarios. In their scenarios 
involving “large” currency movements in the short run, exchange-rate-induced capital losses are – with around 5 percent of GDP – significant for the 
euro area, but much smaller than for China and Japan. EEAG Report 29
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part of the government revenues generated by the
high oil price is “sterilised”in a stabilisation fund, the
central bank will nevertheless hardly be able to meet
its own inflation targets of 8.5 percent this year and
5.5 in 2008. We expect inflation to be 9 percent this
year and around 71/2 percent in 2008.
3.5 Risk and uncertainties for the world economy
Our forecast above depicts the most probable scenario
for the world economy. As always, there are up- and
downside risks. On the upside, the US economy could
swing back to its previous high growth path more
quickly than laid out here. Decreasing oil prices
together with a looser monetary policy stance might
bring this about. But most of the risks to the present-
ed forecast scenario are on the downside. We assume
no worsening of the geopolitical situation, a more or
less stable oil price and no abrupt depreciation of the
US dollar. If, for instance, energy prices were to
increase instead, this might lead to higher wage
demands. In such a scenario, to remain credible mon-
etary policy is bound to respond by taking a restric-
tive course. Furthermore, we have assumed that the
demand-reducing effects caused by the fall in house
prices in the US will be moderate. However, the eco-
nomic slowdown and developments in the housing
market might reinforce each other, leading to a much
stronger fallback in US economic growth.
The expectation of only a moderate slowdown of the
world economy rests on fairly optimistic assumptions
regarding US economic developments and the path
towards the elimination of existing global imbalances.
If the US were to slide into a more severe recession
instead of what is implied by the soft landing sce-
nario, the entire world economy would be affected.
The mechanism could be both reduced demand from
the US and disappointed investor growth expecta-
tions. Financial markets might no longer be willing to
extend credit to the US, thereby triggering a sudden
capital flow reversal. The consequence could be an
abrupt depreciation of the dollar and a lowering of
US prices relative to the rest of the world. In such a
scenario, the dollar would depreciate substantially,
the risk premium on financial markets would sharply
increase and the real estate market in the US could
collapse. But at present, financial markets seem large-
ly to believe in the soft landing scenario. However,
there is a risk in taking too much comfort from this.
Financial crises in the past, mainly in emerging mar-
ket economies, show that financial markets tend to
accept unsustainable developments for a long time
before suddenly reacting to them. (See Chapter 5 of
the 2004 EEAG report as well as Chapter 2 of the
2006 EEAG report.)
3.6 The European economy
Last autumn, the ECB signalled increased inflation-
ary pressures due to the oil price increases and the
improving performance of the European economy.
Improved labour markets may increase wage pres-
sure. Furthermore, in 2006 the ECB on several occa-
sions adjusted its projections upward for both eco-
nomic growth and inflation. However, given the
moderate slowdown of the world economy, stable
inflation expectations in Europe and the apprecia-
tion of the euro, the ECB is likely to keep its refi-
nancing rate at the prevailing level. After the some-
what unexpected interest rate increase by the Bank
of England last January, it is also likely that short-
term interest rates will not change very soon in the
UK either.
Due to the assumed appreciation of the euro and the
decline in the inflation rate, which tends to raise the
real interest rate, overall monetary conditions in the
euro area in 2007 will become less accommodative
than last year. The same holds for the UK, the largest
EU economy outside the euro area.
Long term interest rates – as measured by the ten-year
government bond yield – will more or less remain at
the present level of approximately 4 percent, keeping
the yield curve relatively flat.
The stance of fiscal policy in Europe is assumed to
become somewhat less accommodative as structural
deficits in several countries are expected to decline
(see Figure 1.18). Although last autumn, the EU
Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin) Council
decided to effectively extend the deadline for
Germany to correct its excessive deficit, the new
German government took action to reduce the deficit
below three percent of GDP. The increase in VAT by
3 percentage points on 1 January this year is the cor-
nerstone of this policy towards fiscal consolidation
(see Box 1.2). Although part of the generated tax rev-
enues will be used to decrease ancillary wage costs, fis-
cal policy in Germany has become contractionary this
year: The structural deficit will be reduced by more
than 1/2 percentage point of GDP to around 1 percent
of GDP. The actual deficit will fall this year to
1.6 percent of GDP, as compared to 2.3 percent of
GDP last year (see Table 1.2). Other countries where fiscal poli-
cy will also be contractionary this
year due to efforts to reduce the
structural deficits include Italy,
Greece, Portugal and Hungary.
As with Germany, Italy will also
try to consolidate public finances
by increasing tax revenues.
Instead of raising the VAT – as in
Germany – income tax progres-
sivity has been increased. How-
ever, as tax revenues appear to
have surpassed expectations last
year, resistance to tax increases
seems to be rising. The initially
scheduled reduction in the bud-
get deficit by 35 billion euros





The German VAT increase 
The government has raised the standard VAT rate by 3 percentage points from 1 January 2007. Under the assumption that this 
tax increase is fully shifted on to prices, the CPI will rise by 1.5 percent. At the same time, the social security payroll 
contributions have been reduced by 1.3 percentage points: health insurance contributions have increased by 0.6 percentage 
points, pension insurance contributions by 0.4 percentage points, whereas unemployment insurance contributions have 
decreased by 2.3 percentage points. Since employers and employees each pay half of total social security contributions, labour 
costs will decline by about 0.5 percent and net nominal wages will increase by 1 percent. If the decrease in employers’ 
contributions is fully reflected in prices, the combined effect of the VAT increase and the reduction of social security 
contributions on products sold in Germany will be about 1 percent. This implies that the real net wage of employees who are 
subject to social security contributions will decline by only a small amount of about  percent. Civil servants, retired persons, 
the self-employed and the unemployed will not gain from the reduction of the employee’s social security contributions but will 
suffer from the net price increase: Their real income will decline by 1 percent.  
The fiscal reform package concerns several other areas: savers’ tax-free amount, the private home owner allowance and 
commuter tax deductions. There are further reductions in subsidies and a tighter means-testing for unemployment benefits. All 
in all, the fiscal package will reduce the disposable income of the private sector by slightly less than 0.8 percent of GDP. If one 
includes in addition the reduction of the wage bill in the public sector and some other minor measures undertaken, disposable 
private income will be reduced by more. 
The fiscal package will reduce the structural deficit but will also have adverse effects on consumer spending and GDP. The 
magnitude of the effect depends on how consumers react to changes in disposable income that are generated by changes in 
taxes. If consumers base their saving and spending decisions on current income, consumption would fall more or less 
proportionally to the reduction in income (somewhat more than 1 percent). But there is a strong argument that at least some 
consumers are forward-looking and realise that today’s public deficits will lead to higher taxes in the future. If taxes are then 
actually raised and current disposable income declines, this does not change permanent income and consumption expenditure 
will remain constant (“Ricardian equivalence”). If one assumes that, as a rule-of-thumb, consumers who base their decisions on 
current income have a share of two thirds and the rest consists of “Ricardians”, consumption would decrease by about 
0.7 percent.
a) Leakage effects due to imports reduce the permanent effect on real GDP to somewhat less than 0.5 percent. 
In addition, the fact that the price rises due to the VAT increase were anticipated triggered an increase in residential cons-
truction and consumption (especially durables like cars or household equipment) at the end of last year through intertemporal 
substitution effects. During the first part of this year, such effects are likely to add to the contractionary effects. As we have 
never observed such a large change in indirect taxes in Germany, there is uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the inter-
temporal substitution effects. Available data for retail sales up to November suggest that this effect may not be very high (GDP 
growth is likely to have increased by 0.2 percentage points in 2006 and therefore will fall by 0.2 percentage points in 2007).  
Due to trade linkages, the negative effect of the fiscal package on German domestic demand will also dampen the other 
European economies somewhat. This is aggravated by the fact that German import prices will increase relative to the prices of 
domestically produced goods and services and German export prices will decline. The price competitiveness of German firms 
will improve, which will lead to higher exports and lower imports for Germany. The opposite holds true for its trading partners. 
a) A higher share of “Ricardians” – as some studies suggest – would reduce the effect of the tax increase on consumption. EEAG Report 31
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2007 was already cut by 5 billion
euros last autumn.
To avoid possible EU sanctions,
Greece and Portugal have also
initiated consolidation measures.
Finally, the new government of
Hungary has approved an auster-
ity package – including mainly
tax increases – to reduce the gov-
ernment budget deficit, which
amounted to 10.1 percent of
GDP last year.
Due to upcoming elections, the
budget deficit in France will most
likely not be reduced substantial-
ly this year and is projected to
reach 2.6 percent of GDP. Ex-
pansionary fiscal policy is also to
be expected in Spain; the surplus is to be reduced by
0.4 percentage points to 1.1 percent of GDP this year. 
Overall, aggregate euro area government net borrow-
ing will fall further this year to 1.5 percent of GDP.
Roughly two thirds of this reduction will be of a
structural nature. Also for the EU as a whole, fiscal
policy will become somewhat less accommodative this
and next year. The aggregate government debt ratio in
the EU will fall by 1 percentage point to 61.4 percent
of GDP. 
The cyclical situation
According to our estimates, which are based on the
median of several filter techniques (see Chapter 1 of
the 2006 EEAG report), the output gap in the euro
area has been basically closed since mid-2006. This
situation will approximately persist throughout
2007 and 2008; aggregate demand will not be suffi-
cient to produce significant positive output gaps.
The challenge facing the European economy is to
use the present upswing to improve the growth
potential. This requires structural reforms, in partic-
ular improved conditions for a better utilisation of
the labour force.
Under conditions of a closed output gap, the tenden-
cy for wage moderation, which has characterised
many European countries in recent years, will fade. As
a result, unit labour costs will start rising slightly
more. Given still-low inflation expectations, high but
decreasing unemployment and no substantial oil price
changes, it is unlikely that higher wage claims will
squeeze profits, even if such a risk cannot be fully
excluded. Given labour cost developments elsewhere
in the world and the appreciation of the euro against
the dollar, relative unit labour costs of the euro area
as a whole will no longer fall as they have in the last
two years. 
Current indicators like those of the Ifo World
Economic Survey and Ifo Business Climate Index
registered further improved business conditions at
the end of 2006. Although leading indicators are
falling somewhat, they still signal a relatively bright
climate for the upcoming months. Especially for
Germany, the manufacturing industry has not report-
ed such good business conditions since 1990 (see
Figure 1.19). 
Other indicators also point to favourable business
conditions. Equity prices have been trending upwards
since early 2003 and real interest rates have been his-
torically low since the end of 2001. 
The demand side
The economic expansion in the European Union will
remain strong. Improved labour market conditions
and higher wages will further stimulate private con-
sumption. The German VAT increase will not subdue
consumption for long. Nor will other fiscal consoli-
dation measures (see Box 1.2). Hence, after a weak
first quarter, offsetting part of the high consumption
growth at the end of 2006, we expect a continued
increase in private consumption.
Figure 1.19During the first part of 2007, the somewhat more
moderate expansion in the world economy will
reduce European export growth to some extent.
When world trade picks up again in the course of the
year, it will take European exports with it. Strong
domestic demand will at the same time also strength-
en imports. Overall, growth of imports will outper-
form that of exports with the consequence that net
exports will contribute negatively to GDP growth in
2007. In 2008, the stronger world economy will tend
to reverse this. 
With rising aggregate demand and capacity utilisa-
tion, profits as well as overall conditions for invest-
ment financing are favourable. It took until last year
for business investment to pick up. And it will take
some years of above-average investment growth to
compensate for the long period
of weak business investment in
the past. Hence, there is still
mounting pressure to modernise
the capital stock. Overall, invest-
ment will continue to grow sub-
stantially in 2007 and 2008,
although, with rates of approxi-
mately 4 percent, at a somewhat
more moderate pace than last
year in which it grew by close to
5 percent.
Growth, employment and inflation
On average, output in the EU is
expected to grow by 2.2 percent
in 2007 and 2.5 percent in 2008
(see Figure 1.20). The growth gap
between Europe and Japan, on
the one hand, and the US, on the
other, will almost disappear this
year, basically because growth in
the US will decelerate significant-
ly (see Figure 1.21). Given much
higher population growth in the
US, per capita GDP growth in
both Europe and Japan will out-
perform that in the US over the
forecasting horizon.
Our positive assessment of the
European economy depends on
endogenous business cycle devel-
opments. After a downturn in the
early 2000s, the trough in output
and investment was reached in
the first quarter of 2004. Since then, the EU is experi-
encing a recovery that gathered pace during the first
half of 2006. According to the Ifo Institute (2006),
such an upswing normally lasts around four years.
Endogenous buoyancy forces accompanied by contin-
uingly dynamic exports is likely to remain strong
enough to withstand restraining effects from contrac-
tive fiscal measures in some countries, notably the
VAT increase in Germany. 
The labour market situation in Europe will improve
further and thereby support real disposable income.
Employment will increase moderately (see Figu-
re 1.22). The unemployment rate will continue to fall,
albeit at a considerably slower pace than in 2006. We
project a reduction to an average of 7.7 percent in
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Price increases in the EU will be moderate. The infla-
tion rate, as measured by the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP), will be 2.2 percent in 2007
and 1.9 percent in 2008. The German VAT increase
will lead to a 1/4 percentage point increase of the infla-
tion rate in both the euro area and the EU as a whole
in 2007. 
Differences in output growth within Europe
The general recovery in the EU is associated with
smaller differences in the growth performance among
countries this and next year than in the past (see
Figure 1.24).
In the first half of this year, the largest EU econo-
my, Germany, will be somewhat restrained due to
the massive VAT increase. But this will only be a
temporary phenomenon and
the economic upturn will con-
tinue. The dynamism of both
residential and non-residential
fixed capital formation will
remain strong. The negative
effect of the VAT hike will not
be enough to reduce consump-
tion (see Box 1.2). The persis-
tent high government budget
deficits have meant that tax
increases have been anticipated.
These expected tax increases
can at least partly explain weak
private consumption and in-
creased saving rates in past
years. Permanent income is
therefore affected much less
than current measured disposable income. 
All in all, German real GDP will expand by 1.7 per-
cent in 2007 and 2.2 percent in 2008. Unemployment
will continue to decrease. However, mainly because of
the VAT increase, the inflation rate in 2007, at 2.5 per-
cent, will be considerably higher than in previous
years. 
We expect similar patterns for output growth also in
France, Italy and Spain, albeit somewhat less pro-
nounced than in Germany. This year, economic
growth will experience a moderate slowdown as
compared to last year; in 2008 output growth will
be higher again. In the UK, economic develop-
ments will remain almost as strong as last year.
Private consumption will continue to increase by
somewhat more than 2 percent. As sales prospects
of firms remain promising,
investment will rise substantial-
ly. The weakening of the world
economy will increase the UK
trade deficit somewhat. Overall,
GDP will grow by 2.4 percent in
both this and the next year.
Inflation remains moderate at
around 2 percent. 
Economic growth in the new
EU member countries will
remain strong. For the region as
a whole, GDP will grow by
4.6 percent in 2007 and 4.9 per-
cent in 2008. Inflation will
remain high, with rates between
Figure 1.22
Figure 1.232.1 and 7.0 percent. Whereas most of these coun-
tries will grow at an above-average pace, Malta and
Hungary will underperform (see Chapter 3 for
more details). 
Early this year, Romania and Bulgaria entered the
EU. Both countries are growing fast. Nevertheless,
due to their small share of less than 1 percent in total
European GDP, their contribution to EU growth will
be very modest. Inflation rates are expected to remain
relatively high in both countries. 
4. Macroeconomic policy
Our macroeconomic forecast
is thus one of a continued up-
turn with slightly less growth
than last year. Actual output
will grow somewhat faster
than potential output.4 Dur-
ing 2008, an increase in pace
is likely. As compared to
other regions in the world,
the slowdown this year will be
modest. At the same time,
potential growth is relatively
low, reducing the scope for a
substantial growth push in
2008.
Raising potential growth in
Europe will require structural
reforms in labour, product
and service markets. This has
been a recurrent theme in
previous EEAG reports. In
this report, we analyse the
often praised Scandinavian
model in this respect
(Chapter 4), discuss the role
tax competition can play in
stimulating growth (Chapter
5) and go into the obstacles
economic nationalism may
impose on the growth process
(Chapter 6). 
Cyclical stabilisation via
monetary and fiscal policy is
one element in any strategy
to raise potential growth.
Smoothing business cycles
reduces economic frictions,
lowers average costs and
reduces uncertainty.5 Macroeconomic stability
increases the willingness to accept structural change.
However, stabilisation policy has become harder to
pursue over the past decade. Structural deficits and
high debt-to-GDP ratios have reduced the room of
manoeuvre for fiscal policy during the past years of




4 In Chapter 1 of the 2006 EEAG report, we estimated the trend
growth rate in the euro area to have declined from about 21/4 percent
in 2000 to approximately 13/4 percent in 2005.
5 Evidence on the growth-enhancing effects of macroeconomic sta-
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ally, globalisation have also lowered the effectiveness
of national fiscal policy. In a monetary union, it is
also impossible to adapt monetary policy to the
needs of each individual member country. 
4.1 Fiscal policy
Business cycle developments have been a tailwind for
fiscal consolidation in many European countries.
Nevertheless, the overall fiscal deficit of the EU coun-
tries as a share of GDP fell by only 0.3 percentage
points last year, and no more than a 0.4 percentage
point fall is forecasted for this year. This will result in
an EU budget deficit of 1.6 percent of GDP this year
(see Table 1.2). The EU-wide government debt ratio
has hardly fallen and decreases in the next few years
will also be very small unless stronger consolidation
efforts are made (see Figure 1.5). 
Given the future budget pressures from demographic
developments, as has been discussed in earlier EEAG
reports, the reductions in budget deficits that are
occurring are only moderate. It is true that the fiscal
consolidations in Germany in Italy will have substan-
tial effects this year: The overall EU budget deficit will
be reduced by close to 1/2 percent of GDP. Two thirds
of this can be considered as structural. Given the
position of the business cycle and a current structural
deficit of still approximately 11/2 percent of GDP, we
consider this to be a step in the right direction but it is
insufficient. In fact, we are worried that – as has fre-
quently happened in the past – the opportunity creat-
ed by the current upswing will not be used enough to
strengthen public finances. On the contrary, the cycli-
cal improvement in fiscal balances may be taken as an
excuse for complacency, thus weakening the efforts for
fiscal consolidation. This may exacerbate fiscal prob-
lems in the next downturn and when demographic
factors set in with full force.6
As discussed in Chapter 1 of our 2006 EEAG report,
in a monetary union like the euro area, there are a
number of reasons for a deficit bias of fiscal policy at
the national level. These include myopic behaviour
by governments and voters, lobbying of interest
groups for specific expenditure increases (the com-
mon-pool problem), a desire by political parties to
favour their own constituencies while in power
(strategic considerations), and attempts to raise out-
put above its equilibrium level through aggregate
demand increases (the time inconsistency problem).
As adverse effects of fiscal profligacy can partly be
shifted on to other member countries, all of these
effects are exacerbated in a monetary union with cen-
tralised monetary policy. 
The watering-down of the stability pact leads to pes-
simistic conclusions on fiscal discipline and the possi-
bilities to achieve an appropriate balance between fis-
cal and monetary policy in the long run. One should
be aware that currently low long-term interest rates
are now holding down the interest costs for govern-
ment debt. Although the reasons for the low, long-
term interest rates are not well understood, it is risky
to count on interest rates remaining as low as they are
now (see Figure 1.12).7
Government expenditures
Furthermore, on the structural front, instead of cut-
ting expenditures, taxes are being raised in several
European countries. Examples include the VAT
increase in Germany and the increase in income tax
progressivity in Italy. This is counter to what most
economists – including ourselves – recommend. To
reduce tax distortions that hold back labour supply
and reduce incentives to invest, especially marginal
tax rates need to be cut. This can be achieved by low-
ering government transfers. To further economic
growth in the long run, governments should also re-
focus spending on those categories that foster growth,
like infrastructure, R&D investment and education.
These types of expenditures had to bear a dispropor-
tionate share of the burden of fiscal consolidation in
the past.
Comparing the second half of the 1990s with the
average for the years 2001 to 2005 (the last five years
for which comparable data are available) reveals that
the government expenditure share in GDP in the euro
area has fallen by 2.3 percentage points (see Figu-
re 1.25). Only in two euro area countries, Portugal and
Luxembourg, did this share go up. Of the remaining
EU countries, only Cyprus, Malta and the UK report
increasing shares. In 19 EU countries, government
expenditure as a share of GDP actually decreased
between 1995 to 1999 and 2001 to 2005. The reduc-
tion in the size of government has been largest in
Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland and Sweden
(see Figure 1.25). Note, however, that the latter two
Scandinavian countries initially had government
expenditure shares far above the European average.
6 See Calmfors (2006) for an elaboration of this view. 7 See our discussion in Chapter 2 of the 2006 EEAG report.In that sense, some form of con-
vergence with respect to govern-
ment size appears to be taking
place (see also Table 4.1 of
Chapter 4). 
With respect to the type of
spending, some shifts have been
made towards more public invest-
ment. Despite the reduction in
government expenditure shares
across Europe, government in-
vestment as a share of GDP has
more or less stayed constant over
the last decade (see Figure 1.26).
Differences among countries are,
however, substantial. Roughly
half of the countries have seen
increased public capital invest-
ment shares; the other half has
experienced falling shares. Sharp
increases have occurred in Ire-
land and Hungary; sharp falls in
Austria and the Slovak Republic.
The Lisbon Strategy focuses
attention on research and educa-
tion. This would imply a re-allo-
cation of government spending
towards these areas in a growth
enhancing way. Research ought
to receive higher priority at the
expense of, for example, subsidies
to agriculture.
The EU goal for R&D spending
as a share in GDP, as set by the
Lisbon Summit strategy, is at
least 3 percent in 2010. Accord-
ing to the latest Eurostat data,
R&D expenditure as a percent-
age of GDP in the EU25 stood
at 1.85 percent in 2005 (see Figu-
re 1.27). This is virtually the
same level as in 2000, the year in
which the European Council set
the strategic goal for the next
decade “of becoming the most
competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy in the
world”. R&D intensity has
remained significantly lower in
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the US. Japan alone increased its
R&D expenditure relative to
GDP after 2000, whereas it
remained quite stable in Europe
and decreased somewhat in the
US. However, the EU average
hides wide discrepancies among
member states. Only Sweden and
Finland meet the Lisbon goal of
R&D spending of at least 3 per-
cent of GDP (see also Figure 4.5
in Chapter 4).
With only three years to go until
2010, Europe is still far off target
for R&D spending and the
progress made so far is very mod-
est. R&D expenditures in both
the government and the business sector still need to
rise substantially. With respect to the public part, at
least, Germany, Portugal and Latvia have announced
their intention to prioritise R&D spending. Partly due
to budgetary problems in Germany, the share of gov-
ernment R&D in GDP steadily decreased from
0.83 percent in 1996 to 0.76 percent in 2004. For sim-
ilar reasons, in Portugal this share went from 0.49 per-
cent in 2000 to 0.44 percent in 2003. Given that both
countries still have considerable budgetary problems,
it is questionable to what extent plans to raise this
share are realistic. 
A third type of investment in which public policy
plays an important role is education. In an increas-
ingly globalised world, where low-wage competition
from countries like China, India and Brazil will inten-
sify, structural change towards human-capital inten-
sive sectors in Europe is necessary to cope with the sit-
uation. Also sustainable productivity growth requires
continued investment in a highly skilled and adapt-
able workforce. Economies endowed with a skilled
labour force are better able to create and make effec-
tive use of new technologies.8 Educational attainment
in Europe falls short of what is required to ensure that
adequate skills are available in the labour market and
that new knowledge that can subsequently be diffused
across the economy is produced. 
With respect to expenditures on education, develop-
ments in the euro area have basically stagnated since
1999 (see Figure 1.28). The 0.3 percentage point
increase in the share of these expenditures in GDP in
the EU25 are almost exclusively due to increased
spending in the ten new member countries. There,
two thirds of the increase was financed by the public
sector. The US has increased its lead. There, both
public and private expenditures on education
increased by close to 1/2 percentage point between
1999 and 2003. The small role played by the private
sector in funding education in Europe is notable.
Whereas more than 25 percent of all educational
institutions are financed privately in both Japan and
the US, this share is only slightly above 10 percent in
Europe.
Although European countries should not opt for a
uniform growth strategy, as we discussed in our 2006
EEAG report, it seems clear that expenditures on
R&D and education are too low in most EU states.
They do not seem to be sufficient for the most devel-
oped countries to reach the aspired technological
frontier.
4.2 Monetary policy
After having increased its main refinancing rate in six
consecutive steps from 2 percent in early December
2005 to 3.5 percent in December 2006, the ECB is now
standing at a crossroad: Are inflation expectations
and growth prospects still high enough to warrant
another rise, or should the interest rate be cut to cope
with the forecasted mild slowdown? In our forecast we
assume that the different tendencies will balance each
other and that the ECB will keep its interest rate at
the present level at least until the end of 2008. 
Figure 1.28
8 For example, the complementarity between a skilled work force and
ICT investment is stressed in Section 4.3 in Chapter 4 of this report.
See also Chapter 2 in our 2006 report and Chapter 2 of our 2005
report.Monetary conditions 
On the one hand, monetary policy affects aggregate
demand and prices via interest rates. On the other
hand, it may have an effect via exchange rate devel-
opments. The so-called monetary conditions index
(MCI) captures both dimensions.9 Whereas in the sec-
ond half of 2005 the MCI for the euro area did not
move much, it increased sharply during 2006, imply-
ing more restrictive monetary conditions in the euro
area (see Figure 1.29). In 2005, the real depreciation
of the euro more than compensated for the already
increasing real interest rate. 
In 2006, both the real appreciation of the euro and the
increased real short-term interest rate moved the MCI
in the same upward direction. Since the introduction
of the euro, monetary conditions – measured by the
MCI – have never been as restrictive as they are now.
Holding nominal and real interest rates approximate-
ly constant, a likely continuation of the real apprecia-
tion of the euro will imply stricter monetary condi-
tions throughout this and the next year. Based upon
some correlation analyses, the smoothed MCI in the
past on average has had a lead of approximately one
year with respect to the European Sentiment
INdicator (ESIN) of the euro area. Hence, by keeping
the main refinancing rate fixed, monetary conditions
will exert a restrictive influence on the euro area busi-
ness cycle during this and the next year.
The monetary pillar of the ECB
Ever since its inception, the ECB
has been criticised for its mone-
tary policy strategy (see De
Haan et al. 2005 for a discus-
sion). A particularly controver-
sial element in the ECB strategy
is the role of money. In addition
to a broad assessment of the
risks to price stability, the ECB
uses a quantitative reference
value for the annual growth rate
of a broad monetary aggregate
(M3) to assess whether mone-
tary developments pose a risk to
price stability. Initial ECB com-
ments as well as the initial
labelling of monetary developments as the first pillar
within the two-pillar strategy have suggested that
money would be a dominant input into ECB policy
decisions.10
After an evaluation of its monetary policy strategy,
the ECB Governing Council decided in May 2003
that the introductory statement of the ECB President
after a Governing Council meeting would henceforth
start with the economic analysis to identify short- to
medium-term risks to price stability. The monetary
analysis will then follow to assess medium- to long-
term trends in inflation in view of the close relation-
ship between money and prices over extended hori-
zons. Duisenberg explained these changes at the
beginning of the press conference on 8 May 2003:
“The introductory statement will henceforth present
first economic analysis, followed by monetary analy-
sis. It concludes by cross-checking the analyses con-
ducted under these two pillars.”
This decision was widely interpreted as implying that
money had become less important in the ECB mone-
tary strategy. The ECB kept to its two-pillar strategy
but reduced the prominence of the monetary pillar by
putting it second and discussing it after what initially
was labelled the “broadly-based assessment”. In this
way, the monetary pillar is mainly used to cross-check
what has since been labelled the “economic analysis”.
According to De Grauwe (2003): “The ECB is down-




9 The MCI is calculated as a weighted average of the real short-term
interest rate and the real effective exchange rate (based on consumer
price indices) relative to their values in a base period. The relative
weights of the interest rate and the exchange rate component are
6 to 1. As with the MCI published by the European Commission
(DG ECFIN), these weights reflect each variable’s relative impact on
GDP after two years as derived from simulations in the OECD’s
Interlink model.
10 When, for instance, ECB President Duisenberg was asked during a
press conference on 13 October 1998 about the relative importance
of money, he noted that “... it is not a coincidence that I have used
the words that money will play a prominent role. So if you call it the
two pillars, one pillar is thicker than the other is, or stronger than the
other, but how much I couldn’t tell you”.EEAG Report 39
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its monetary policy strategy, and rightly so. It just did
not make sense anymore to pretend that the money
stock is the most important variable to watch. This
variable is so much polluted by noise that it rarely
gave the right warning signal of future inflation.”
Svensson (2003) summarised and interpreted the
Governing Council decision similarly and concluded
that “[t]his is a change in the right direction, but it is
not enough”.
However, on various occasions, the ECB has stressed
that, as in the past, the monetary analysis still plays a
role in its monetary strategy. Berger et al. (2006) chal-
lenge this view by showing that in the actual press
releases of the ECB the monetary pillar has not
played a significant role – at least not during the
Duisenberg era. Furthermore, according to the
econometric analysis of the same authors, actual ECB
interest rate decisions are barely influenced by consid-
erations based on the monetary pillar. Policy inten-
tions based on future developments in the real econo-
my and on prices are the main factors explaining actu-
al policy changes. This is in line with, for instance,
Gerlach (2004), who concludes that most econometric
estimates of reaction functions for the euro area fail
to find that money growth plays a role in the ECB’s
interest rate decisions. 
Sometimes, it is argued – also by the ECB – that
monetary developments can be useful to assess
asset market prices. However, the ECB at the same
time has often stated that it does not explicitly tar-
get asset prices, thereby limiting the relevance of
the argument. Furthermore, the argument implicit-
ly assumes that it is actually possible to distinguish
ex ante between a change in asset prices due to fun-
damental factors and those due to non-fundamen-
tal factors. Only if central banks have information
that is superior to that of the private sector, would
they be able to make such better judgments of asset
market prices. As Mishkin (2001) puts it: “Without
an informational advantage, the central bank is as
likely to mis-predict the presence of a bubble as the
private market and thus will frequently be mistak-
en.” For the same reason, Bernanke and Gertler
(2000) argue that a central bank dedicated to price
stability should pay no attention to asset prices per
se, except insofar as they are signals of changes in
expected inflation. This is why the ECB indeed uses
asset price developments in its economic pillar.
Neither of the two pillars, however, should be
directed towards assessing asset market develop-
ments. 
In our view, the ECB would be ill-advised to disregard
monetary factors, but that taking proper account of
these does neither necessarily entail monitoring the
growth rate of M3 nor does it require a separate mon-
etary pillar. One should use all information available
to make the best forecast possible of inflation (and
real activity) in the economy.11
What has become more and more important in
research on monetary policy as well as actual central
bank practice is the role of expectations in the for-
mulation of monetary policy. According to modern
monetary theory, a central bank has basically two
key instruments at its disposal to achieve price sta-
bility. First, it can directly affect the money market
interest rate by setting refinancing rates. The extent
that the money market rate affects other – and for
private decisions more relevant – interest rates in the
economy depends on future expected developments
of the money market rate. Long-term interest rates
will hardly react to changes in the refinancing rate if
markets believe that these will only last for a short
period. On the other hand, if markets expect money
market rates to be affected for longer periods of
time, long-term interest rates will change. More gen-
erally, market expectations are the second important
channel via which a central bank can affect eco-
nomic behaviour. Even without actual policy rate
changes, a credible central bank can influence
expectations of future developments in prices and
the real economy and thereby affect interest rate
expectations, which will lead, to a certain extent, to
self-fulfilling prophecies. Monetary policy over time
has more and more become the art of expectation
management.
A Taylor rule for ECB policy
When using so-called Taylor rules to analyse the
appropriate stance of monetary policy, it is again
important to take a forward-looking perspective.12
When exploring different ECB Taylor rules for the
euro area, Sauer and Sturm (2007) conclude that only
forward-looking specifications (by either taking
expectations derived from surveys or assuming ratio-
nal expectations) give estimated Taylor rules in line
with both theoretical models and communicated
behaviour of the ECB itself. 
11 This view is the dominating one among academic economists. See,
for example, Gerlach (2004) for a succinct formulation.
12 In 1993, John Taylor of Stanford University established a rela-
tionship between the central bank interest rate and two indicators:
the deviation of inflation from its target and the output gap (Taylor
1993). The Taylor rule interest rate is generally seen as a benchmark
interest rate for actual monetary policy.For that reason, we explore a for-
ward-looking Taylor rule in this
section. Our “modified” Taylor
rule is based on the idea that in
order to ensure medium-term
price stability, the central bank
interest rate is managed to keep
expected output growth and
inflation at their target rates.13
Any deviations of the expected
inflation and growth rates from
their targets will induce the cen-
tral bank to adjust the interest
rate. If the short-term interest
rate is above this modified Taylor
interest rate, it indicates that
monetary policy is more restric-
tive than one would expect based
on anticipations of inflation and
output growth. If the actual
interest rate is below the modified Taylor rate, it indi-
cates that monetary policy is more expansionary than
the inflation and economic growth expectations
would suggest. The formula for the modified Taylor
rate is as follows: 
where i,   and  y indicate, respectively, the nominal
interest rate, the inflation rate and the GDP growth
rate. Bars indicate equilibrium or target levels and the
superscript e expectations for the next twelve months
as compared to the preceding twelve months.14
Expected growth and inflation rates are taken from
consensus forecasts as published on a monthly basis
by Consensus Economics Inc.   and   are the weights
given by the central bank to deviations from the infla-
tion and growth targets.
The more expected growth exceeds trend growth, the
higher the modified Taylor interest rate will be. In the
same way, the more expected inflation exceeds its tar-
get, the higher the Taylor interest rate will be. We use
data at the frequency of the ECB Governing Council
meetings since 1999 to estimate the implicit weights
given by the ECB itself.
In practice, it is commonly observed that, especial-
ly since the early 1990s, central banks worldwide
tend to move policy interest rates in small steps
without reversing direction quickly. To capture such
interest rate smoothing, the previous equation is
viewed as the mechanism by which the target inter-
est rate, i
*, is determined. The actual interest rate i
adjusts only slowly to this target according to i =
ρi-1 + (1–ρ)i
*, where ρ is the smoothing parameter.
In our estimation procedure we follow this
approach as well. 
Figure 1.30 shows, besides the modified Taylor rule
rate (without interest smoothing), the actual main
refinancing rate set by the ECB, the expected infla-
tion rate and the expected GDP growth rate for the
next twelve months according to consensus fore-
casts.15 Except for the winter of 2001/2002, in which
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Figure 1.30
13 In our formulation, real economic developments are proxied by
growth rates instead of output levels, as is more common in the
Taylor rule literature. Under the assumption of constant potential
output growth, this implies that instead of the level of the output
gap, we include the expected change in the output gap. To underline
this difference, we therefore label our estimated reaction function as
the “modified” Taylor rule. For instance, Walsh (2003) and
Geberding et al. (2004) have argued that such a “speed limit policy”,
or “difference rule”, performs quite well in the presence of imperfect
information about the output gap. Given that output gaps are noto-
riously difficult to measure and tend to be revised substantially over
time, this appears quite plausible. Growth rates, on the other hand,
are much less prone to data revisions. Secondly, the use of growth
cycles has the advantage that they in general have a clear lead over
classical cycles. Furthermore, most theoretical models abstract from
long-run growth. When allowing for trend growth, it is possible to
specify Taylor rules in terms of output growth rates. Finally, expec-
tations and forecasts are normally formulated in terms of growth
rates and are therefore readily available.
14 The intercept term in this specification, i
-
we interpret as the neu-
tral nominal interest rate. The neutral interest rate corresponds to
the nominal interest rate that would prevail if all prices were flexible.
Woodford (2003) refers to this rate as the Wicksellian natural rate of
interest. Put more practically, the neutral interest rate is equal to the
nominal interest rate that would prevail if inflation is at target and
output growth equals its trend rate.
15 The estimation results imply the following equation in which all
estimated parameters are statistically significant and the residuals do
not show any signs of autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity: EEAG Report 41
Chapter 1
both growth and inflation expectations plummeted,
the estimated modified Taylor rule appears to lead
actual ECB interest rate decisions quite well. If the
Taylor rate lies above the ECB main refinancing rate,
then the chances for an interest rate increase are high-
er than for a decrease. The reverse holds for Taylor
rates below the actual ECB interest rate. 
Lower expected inflation in the euro area over the
next twelve months caused the modified Taylor rate
to fall below the actual rate at the end of last year.
Despite that, actual inflation rates were above target
until September 2006 and inflation expectations
remained stable throughout 2006 at around 2 percent
– thereby indicating that ECB monetary policy is
credible. 
To summarise, not only does our monetary condition
index indicate that monetary policy was rather restric-
tive in 2006, also our expectations-based Taylor rule
suggests that the ECB main refinancing rate is above
target. We therefore do not expect another increase in
the interest rate soon. If anything, a decrease is more
likely. 
Nevertheless, given the rhetoric of the ECB – stressing
the upward risks with respect to inflation due to the
abundant liquidity in the eurosystem as well as oil
price and wage developments – we expect a constant
refinancing rate at 3.5 percent, equivalent to a 3.7 per-
cent, three-month money market rate. While many
would still consider it to be roughly neutral, our
Taylor rule estimates and the continuing appreciation
of the euro suggest that this rate exerts contractionary
effects.16
As we argued last year (EEAG 2006), slow progress
on the side of fiscal authorities to reduce deficits may
force the ECB to keep interest rates high to keep infla-
tion around target. Hence, stronger fiscal consolida-
tion efforts, as recommended above, could create
room for lower interest rates.
How well does “one size fit all”?
A topic that is regularly discussed among ECB watch-
ers is the cost for the euro area countries of having a
common monetary policy. A single monetary policy
almost by definition implies that policy will not be
appropriate for everybody. The larger the difference
between the actual monetary policy and the monetary
policy preferred by individual member countries, the
more likely it is that the ECB will be under political
pressure. In line with Clarida et al. (1998), we will
henceforth label this difference country-specific stress
– stress in a monetary system occurs when for what-
ever reason a central bank is unable to set its policy
instrument optimally.17 We provide stress indicators
whose evolution over time supplies important infor-
mation concerning the adequacy of the single mone-
tary policy for each of the EMU member countries
(see Box 1.3).
The main results of this exercise are reported in
Table 1.3. Assuming the ECB had conducted mone-
tary policy for Ireland alone, it would on average have
set the interest rate 1.2 percentage points higher. At
the other extreme is Germany. There, the interest rate
would, on average, have been almost 0.4 percentage
points lower. Belgium and Italy are the countries with
the lowest absolute levels of such structural stress in
the euro area. 
Table 1.3 also shows the difference in the neutral
rate between the euro area and three EU countries
outside the euro area under the assumption that the
behaviour of the central banks of the latter could
be well described by the reaction function of the
ECB.18 Whereas for both Denmark and Sweden,
the differences are not very large, a difference of
more than 0.4 percentage points for the UK is more
substantial.
Besides overall structural stress, Table 1.3 reports the
deviations between the modified Taylor rate for the
euro area and the corresponding country-specific
Taylor rates that are due to cyclical differences. By
construction these differences sum to zero over the
estimation sample for each country.19 Not only was
structural stress the highest for Ireland, but also with
respect to cyclical deviations, Ireland shows the
strongest cyclical stress: The Root Mean Squared
Error (RMSE) – measuring the degree of volatility –
exceeds those of all other countries. This is explained
by both a more pronounced growth cycle in Ireland
than elsewhere and different timing of the cycle. 
17 Clarida et al. (1998) were the first to propose a so-called stress indi-
cator, which they used to analyse the causes of the 1992/93 crisis of
the European Monetary System (EMS).
18 It is not possible to carry out this analysis for the new EU member
countries as data on GDP growth and inflation expectations back to
1999 are not available.
19 Differences in the number of ECB Governing Council meetings
during the years allows the sum of the reported year averages to dif-
fer from zero. Whereas in 1999 there were only ten relevant meetings,
in 2001 to 2004, eleven meetings took place. In 2005 and 2006, we
take twelve meetings into account and in 2000 13 such meetings. 
16 The 99 percent confidence interval around our estimated neutral
nominal interest rate of 2.96 percent equals [2.63, 3.29], which does
not include 3.5 percent.With inflation expectations above 31/2 percent dur-
ing the first half of 2006 and expectations as low as
11/4 percent in 2005, cyclical fluctuations in infla-
tion were rather strong in the Netherlands during
the past eight years. These cyclical changes in infla-
tion expectations would have warranted a 1.6 per-
centage point higher main refinancing rate for the
Netherlands in 2001 and a 1.25 percentage point
lower one in 2005. Cyclical stress in Germany, on
the other hand, has been relatively low overall. Only
the year 2003, in which inflation expectations in
Germany were rather low, stands out in this cyclical
perspective; combined also with cyclically low
growth, the main refinancing rate should have been
almost 0.7 percentage points lower from a purely
German perspective that year.
For Denmark and Sweden, if their central banks had
used the same reaction function as the ECB, the
cyclical stress would have been comparable to the
situation in countries like Austria and Finland and
clearly lower than for countries like Ireland, the
Netherlands and Portugal. The cyclical stress for the





In theory, the unobserved optimal monetary policy rule for a country depends upon both structural and preference parameters. The
former relate to how the economy works, whereas the latter summarise the preferences of the central bank. We assume that all 
EMU member countries voluntarily decided to participate, thereby signalling that in principle the institutional set-up of the ECB – 
and thereby the preference parameters as implied by the ECB – is preferred over the situation prevailing before the euro.
a)
However, at the same time, we also assume that the functioning of the economy, that is, the structural parameters, is basically the 
same across all member countries. As the ECB has to take into account developments on the aggregate European level, 
asymmetries in inflation and cyclical developments across countries will generate differences between the actual interest rate and 
the interest rate that would have applied if the same Taylor rule as that of the ECB had been applied on the national level, 
responding to national inflation and growth instead of to the euro area aggregates. We call the difference country-specific stress.
Hence, 
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where  and  are taken from the estimated Taylor rule for the euro area as a whole and j indicates an individual euro area 
member. A negative value for Sj implies that – given the estimated ECB reaction function – actual monetary policy of the ECB for 
country j is more accommodative than what could be expected using country-specific data. If, on the other hand, Sj is positive, 
monetary policy appears too tight for country j.
Following Flaig and Wollmershäuser (2006), we analyse the development of the dispersion of expected real GDP growth and 
inflation across the euro area countries. Again we use consensus forecasts figures to capture the forward-looking aspect of 
monetary policy.
b) We are able to decompose country-specific stress (Sj
*) into, on the one hand, structural and cyclical 
components and, on the other hand, inflation- and growth-driven stress.
c)
Structural stress is defined as the difference between the estimated neutral interest rate for the euro area and the implied neutral 
interest rate for the country in question. We split up the neutral nominal interest rate in the neutral real interest rate and the 
inflation target which we proxy for each country by its expected inflation average over the sample. We assume the neutral real 
interest rate to be the same across all European countries, that is  where  r is the real interest rate.
d) Given this 
assumption, the difference between the neutral nominal interest rate for the euro area and that for a specific country is solely due 
to the long-run inflation differential.
e) For the euro area as a whole the estimated nominal and real neutral rates are about 3 percent 
and 1.1 percent, respectively.  
a) In implementing this concept, Flaig and Wollmershäuser (2006) take the optimal monetary policy rule to correspond to the policy rule that was 
adopted by the country in the pre-EMU period. They thereby take an extreme position. Besides keeping the structural parameters constant over time 
and country-specific, they also assume that the euro was forced upon the participating countries and that each individual nation would prefer a 
central bank with a similar behaviour as its own before the establishment of the monetary union. Hence, they keep the preference parameters in the 
policy rule constant over time and country-specific. For many countries the move to a more independent and thereby more credible central bank 
actually was (and still is) a strong motive for participating in the monetary union. This did not only apply for most southern European countries, 
which were in this way able to lower both their interest rates as well as there inflation rates substantially, but also for a country like Finland (see 
Section 5 in Chapter 4 of this report). 
b) As Consensus Economics Inc. does not publish inflation and growth forecasts for Luxembourg, we are not able to include this country in our 
analysis. Given its GDP share of approximately 0.3 percent of euro area GDP, this will hardly affect the results. 
c) We concentrate on the difference between the euro area optimal interest rate and the country-specific optimal interest rate, that is, we focus on Sj
*
in the above equation and neglect the term (i-i
*) – the difference between the actual interest rate and the optimal interest rate for the euro area. This 
latter term is constant across countries and therefore irrelevant for a cross-country comparison. 
d) Following Laubach and Williams (2003) or Giammaioli and Valla (2003), it would be possible to let the neutral real interest rate be a function of 
the trend growth rate. While the estimated ECB policy rule and the cyclical stress measures would not be affected by this, it would introduce a 
second structural source for stress, “stress due to different trend growth rates”, and therefore increase overall stress levels somewhat. 
e) Hence, we allow target inflation rates to differ across countries and approximate these targets by the average expected inflation rate since 1999. 
Restricting the country-specific target inflation rate to be equal to the target inflation rate for the euro area implies that there are no longer any 
structural differences and inflation differentials are solely attributed to cyclical stress. Overall stress is only affected by such a change to a small 
extent.
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countries of relatively similar size like France or
Germany. Especially GDP growth expectations have
not been synchronised with the euro area. Hence, if
similar cyclical deviations persist, they provide a
good argument for the UK to remain outside the
euro area. 
It is not surprising that we estimate higher stress in
smaller countries. Due to their size, the ECB – when
focusing upon the euro area as a whole – gives more
weight to large economies. From a purely European
perspective and assuming the ECB takes a truly
aggregate euro area perspective, it makes more sense
to weigh stress levels by country shares in GDP.20 To
be able to aggregate stress indicators to the euro area,
we furthermore neglect the sign of the stress level at a
country level.21 Hence, aggregate stress in the euro
area is computed as a weighted average of absolute
country-specific stress levels. Such a stress indicator
can serve as a useful measure of relevant divergence
tendencies in the euro area. 
Table 1.3
Decomposition of country stress level 
Structural Cyclical
99–06 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 RMSE
Austria 0.24 0.42 0.67 0.21 0.20 0.05 0.27 – 1.27 – 0.48 0.65
Belgium 0.12 0.39 0.18 0.24 0.39 0.57 – 0.02 – 0.96 – 0.63 0.57
Finland 0.19 – 0.18 – 0.90 – 0.83 0.77 0.16 0.96 0.07 0.08 0.72
France 0.36 0.27 0.19 0.60 – 0.03 – 0.15 – 0.52 – 0.46 0.12 0.40
Germany 0.37 – 0.15 – 0.27 – 0.13 0.18 0.69 – 0.08 0.17 – 0.35 0.35
Greece – 1.08 0.52 1.72 0.49 – 0.68 – 1.70 – 0.78 0.06 0.09 1.10
Ireland – 1.20 – 1.88 – 2.36 – 2.07 0.81 0.41 2.74 1.08 1.31 1.88
Italy – 0.16 0.27 0.14 – 0.09 – 0.41 – 0.83 – 0.30 0.41 0.72 0.54
Netherlands – 0.29 – 0.72 – 1.35 – 1.92 – 0.68 0.83 1.94 1.64 0.27 1.39
Portugal – 0.65 – 1.93 – 0.21 – 0.45 – 0.46 – 0.12 0.62 0.40 1.80 1.04
Spain – 0.92 0.16 0.95 0.80 0.41 – 0.66 – 0.04 – 0.77 – 0.86 0.74
Denmark – 0.19 0.06 0.86 0.96 – 0.28 – 0.79 0.13 – 0.57 – 0.43 0.68
Sweden 0.29 1.07 0.08 0.73 – 0.55 – 0.68 0.21 0.05 – 0.75 0.75
United Kingdom – 0.44 1.24 1.08 1.18 – 0.25 – 1.26 – 1.36 – 0.62 – 0.03 1.10
of which related to differences in inflation expectations 
Austria 0.24 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.20 – 0.52 – 0.06 0.26
Belgium 0.12 – 0.10 – 0.08 0.21 0.22 0.43 0.07 – 0.40 – 0.29 0.31
Finland 0.19 – 0.52 – 0.72 – 0.55 – 0.16 0.25 0.94 0.34 0.44 0.57
France 0.36 0.28 0.36 0.57 0.02 – 0.36 – 0.58 – 0.32 0.02 0.38
Germany 0.37 – 0.08 – 0.14 – 0.22 0.12 0.59 0.19 0.00 – 0.39 0.31
Greece – 1.08 – 0.46 0.54 0.60 – 0.06 – 0.36 – 0.17 – 0.20 0.00 0.46
Ireland – 1.20 0.19 – 0.63 – 0.86 – 0.45 – 0.96 0.97 1.01 0.72 0.87
Italy – 0.16 – 0.01 – 0.05 0.22 0.11 – 0.31 – 0.31 0.05 0.27 0.24
Netherlands – 0.29 – 0.48 – 0.71 – 1.58 – 0.86 – 0.05 1.11 1.25 1.19 1.05
Portugal – 0.65 – 0.87 0.03 – 0.14 – 0.21 – 0.43 0.27 0.48 0.68 0.50
Spain – 0.92 0.29 0.30 0.12 0.02 – 0.27 0.09 – 0.18 – 0.35 0.27
Denmark – 0.19 – 0.96 – 0.74 0.33 0.10 – 0.11 0.45 0.47 0.42 0.55
Sweden 0.29 0.44 – 0.03 – 0.19 – 0.93 – 0.83 0.35 0.84 0.30 0.63
United Kingdom – 0.44 – 0.74 0.17 0.68 0.23 – 0.40 – 0.27 0.08 0.14 0.45
of which related to differences in growth expectations
Austria 0.39 0.56 0.13 0.10 – 0.04 0.07 – 0.75 – 0.42 0.45
Belgium 0.48 0.26 0.03 0.17 0.14 – 0.09 – 0.57 – 0.34 0.38
Finland 0.34 – 0.18 – 0.28 0.93 – 0.09 0.02 – 0.27 – 0.35 0.49
France 0.00 – 0.17 0.03 – 0.04 0.21 0.06 – 0.14 0.10 0.20
Germany – 0.07 – 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.10 – 0.27 0.17 0.03 0.20
Greece 0.98 1.19 – 0.11 – 0.62 – 1.34 – 0.61 0.27 0.09 0.88
Ireland – 2.07 – 1.73 – 1.21 1.26 1.37 1.77 0.07 0.59 1.46
Italy 0.28 0.18 – 0.30 – 0.52 – 0.53 0.01 0.35 0.45 0.43
Netherlands – 0.25 – 0.64 – 0.34 0.18 0.89 0.83 0.38 – 0.92 0.69
Portugal – 1.06 – 0.24 – 0.30 – 0.25 0.31 0.36 – 0.08 1.12 0.64
Spain – 0.13 0.66 0.68 0.38 – 0.39 – 0.12 – 0.59 – 0.51 0.55
Denmark 1.02 1.60 0.63 – 0.38 – 0.67 – 0.32 – 1.04 – 0.85 0.96
Sweden 0.63 0.11 0.92 0.38 0.15 – 0.14 – 0.79 – 1.05 0.70
United Kingdom 1.98 0.90 0.50 – 0.48 – 0.86 – 1.09 – 0.69 – 0.17 1.04
20 By construction these weighted stress levels sum to zero over the
euro area member countries for each point in time.
21 We make the simplifying assumption that too high and too low
interest rates are causing stress to an equal degree.The use of economic weights should assure that no
systematic differences in stress levels occur in the
long run. Hence, in case the political weights
attached by the ECB to each member country equal
their economic weight, then all stress should be more
or less randomly distributed across the individual
countries. Table 1.4 shows that this is not the case:
Especially the large countries, and in particular
Germany, have much higher weighted absolute stress
levels and therefore implicitly have received a lower
political weight than suggested by their economic
share in euro area GDP. Hence, this analysis suggests
that developments in small member countries have
received a more than proportional weight in the
monetary policy decisions of the ECB.
Our measure of aggregate stress in the euro area as
defined above on average equals 0.6 percentage
points and does not show a clear trend over time
(see Table 1.4). Hence, these
results do not suggest that the
degree of business cycle syn-
chronisation has steadily in-
creased during the past eight
years. This speaks against the
argument that the monetary
union would automatically
reduce differences in cyclical
developments among the mem-
ber countries.
Nevertheless, stress levels are not
constant over time. Figure 1.31
shows how overall stress and
some of its subcomponents have
evolved. In particular, during
2003 and in the summer of 2005
stress levels were relatively high
in the euro area. In 2003, mainly low inflation in
Germany and low growth in Italy were responsible for
this. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the burst
of the New Economy bubble, we see a clear fall in
absolute cyclical stress levels, indicating that a com-
mon shock hit the euro area. This allowed the ECB to
reduce stress in all member countries at the same time.
In 2000 and 2001 the largest part of euro area stress
was accounted for by France and the Netherlands.
Over time the burden first shifted to Germany (2002
and 2003) and later to especially Spain and Italy (see
Figure 1.32). Whereas for Germany and Spain prob-
lems were mainly of a structural nature, the Italian





Decomposition of the absolute stress levels, weighted by country GDP 
 Total  Structural  Cyclical 
  99–06  99–06  99–06  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Germany  0.110  0.108  0.082 0.045 0.079 0.040 0.063 0.203 0.029 0.084 0.104 
Spain  0.100  0.096  0.065 0.019 0.100 0.083 0.047 0.069 0.018 0.081 0.089 
France  0.096  0.076  0.067 0.059 0.051 0.128 0.029 0.034 0.111 0.099 0.031 
Netherlands  0.079  0.018  0.077 0.046 0.085 0.122 0.043 0.053 0.123 0.103 0.036 
Italy  0.081  0.029  0.078 0.048 0.025 0.033 0.073 0.149 0.054 0.109 0.129 
Ireland  0.030  0.022  0.029 0.034 0.042 0.037 0.015 0.010 0.049 0.019 0.024 
Greece  0.027  0.023  0.018 0.014 0.036 0.013 0.014 0.036 0.024 0.005 0.003 
Belgium  0.019  0.004  0.018 0.014 0.007 0.013 0.015 0.021 0.016 0.036 0.023 
Austria  0.018  0.007  0.016 0.013 0.021 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.039 0.015 
Portugal  0.018  0.012  0.014 0.036 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.033 
Finland  0.012  0.004  0.011 0.005 0.018 0.018 0.015 0.008 0.019 0.003 0.003 
Euro  Area  0.592  0.399  0.476 0.333 0.468 0.509 0.331 0.595 0.467 0.588 0.491 
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Real gross domestic product, consumer prices and unemployment rates 
  Gross domestic product  Consumer prices 






in %  2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
EU27  34.3  2.9 2.2 2.5  2.2 2.2 1.9 7.9 7.7 7.4 
Switzerland  1.0  2.7 2.2 1.5  1.1 0.5 0.9 4.0 3.2 3.1 
Norway  0.6  2.7 2.4 2.3  2.2 2.1 2.2 3.6 3.3 3.4 
Western  and  Central  Europe 36.0  2.9 2.2 2.5  2.2 2.2 1.9 7.7 7.5 7.2 
US  32.9  3.4 2.5 2.8  3.2 2.7 2.6 4.7 4.9 4.9 
Japan  12.3  2.1 2.0 2.2  0.3 0.3 0.5 4.2 4.0 3.7 
Canada  2.7  2.8 2.2 2.4  2.2 2.0 2.0 6.4 6.6 6.5 
Industrialised  countries  total 83.8  3.0 2.3 2.6  2.3 2.1 2.0 6.0 5.9 5.8 
Newly industrialised 
countries              
Russia  1.8  6.5 6.0 6.0  9.5 9.0 7.5 7.0 6.8 6.4 
East Asia
a)  4.7  5.2  4.4  4.6  . . . . . . 
China  5.1  10.5  10.0  10.0  . . . . . . 
Latin America
b)  4.6  4.8  3.8  4.0  . . . . . . 
Newly industrialised 
countries  total  16.2  6.9  6.2  6.3  . . . . . . 
Total
c)  100.0  3.6  2.9  3.2  . . . . . . 
World  trade,  volume    8.5  7.5  8.0  . . . . . . 
a) Weighted average of Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. Weighted with the gross
domestic product of 2005 in US dollars. – 
b) Weighted average of Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Columbia, Venezuela, Chile and
Peru. Weighted with the gross domestic product of 2005 in US dollars. – 
c) Sum of the listed groups of countries. Weighted with
the gross domestic product of 2005 in US dollars. – 
d) Standardised unemployment rates. 
Sources: EU; OECD; IMF; National Statistical Offices; 2006, 2007 and 2008: calculations by the EEAG. EEAG Report 47
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Table A2 
Real gross domestic product, consumer prices and unemployment rates in European countries 
   Weighted Gross Domestic Product Consumer Prices
a) Unemployment rate
b)
   (GDP)  in % in %
   in %  2006  2007   2008  2006  2007   2008  2006  2007   2008 
Germany   20.9  2.5   1.7   2.2  1.8  2.5  1.5  8.4   8.2   8.0 
France    15.7 2.1 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.5 1.7 9.2 8.8 8.6 
Italy    13.1 1.7 1.2 1.4 2.2 1.8 2.0 7.1 6.9 6.8 
Spain    7.8 3.7 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.2 2.9 8.3 7.7 7.5 
Netherlands    4.5 3.0 2.2 2.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 4.0 3.8 3.7 
Belgium    2.7 3.1 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.9 8.5 8.4 8.2 
Austria    2.2 3.3 2.3 2.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 4.9 4.8 4.6 
Greece    1.6 4.1 3.7 3.9 3.3 3.1 2.9 9.1 8.9 8.7 
Finland    1.4 5.8 4.0 3.4 1.2 1.5 1.3 7.9 7.8 7.7 
Ireland    1.4 5.2 4.5 4.9 2.7 2.6 2.4 4.4 4.5 4.3 
Portugal    1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 3.2 2.6 2.2 7.4 7.3 7.2 
Slovenia    0.3 5.1 3.8 4.2 2.3 2.4 2.1 6.1 6.1 5.9 
Luxembourg    0.2 6.2 4.2 4.5 3.0 2.8 2.5 4.8 4.7 4.5 
Euro area
c)  73.2 2.7 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.8 7.8 7.6 7.4 
United  Kingdom    17.1 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 5.5 5.7 5.6 
Sweden    2.7 4.3 3.6 3.1 1.6 1.9 2.1 6.5 6.4 6.2 
Denmark    1.9 3.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.0 3.9 3.8 3.7 
EU16
c)  94.8 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 7.4 7.2 7.0 
Poland    1.9 5.4 4.6 5.0 1.3 2.1 2.2  14.6  14.0  13.3 
Czech  Republic   0.8 6.2 4.7 4.5 2.1 2.6 2.5 7.2 6.9 6.7 
Hungary    0.8 3.9 2.0 2.7 4.0 3.8 4.1 7.5 7.5 7.3 
Romania  0.6 6.5 5.0    5.5    6.7 7.0 6.9 7.8 6.9 6.5 
Slovak  Republic   0.3 6.4 5.7 6.0 4.2 3.5 3.7  13.4  13.0  12.4 
Lithuania    0.2 8.5 7.3 7.5 3.7 3.3 3.4 5.8 5.3 5.0 
Bulgaria  0.2  5.7  5.8   6.1   7.2  5.6  4.9  8.6  8.2   7.9  
Cyprus    0.1 4.0 3.5 3.8 2.3 2.1 2.2 5.2 5.3 5.2 
Latvia    0.1  11.0 8.8 9.4 6.4 6.1 6.2 7.2 6.6 6.3 
Estonia    0.1  11.2 8.6 9.1 4.3 4.1 4.2 5.2 4.5 4.3 
Malta    0.0 2.4 1.9 2.2 2.8 2.4 2.3 7.5 7.5 7.1 
EU Acceding  
Countries  5.2 5.8 4.6 4.9 3.1 3.4 3.4  10.2 9.7 9.2 
EU27
c)  100 2.9 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.9 7.9    7.7   7.4 
a) Western Europe (except for Switzerland): harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – 
b) Standardised. – 
c) Sum of the listed
countries. Gross domestic product and consumer prices weighted with the gross domestic product of 2005 in US dollars;
unemployment rate weighted with the number of employees in 2004. 
Sources: EUROSTAT; OECD; IMF; 2006, 2007 and 2008: calculations by the EEAG. 
Table A3 
Key forecast figures for the euro area 
   2005  2006  2007  2008 
   Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product  1.4 2.7 2.0 2.3
Private consumption  1.4 1.9 1.6 1.8
Government consumption  1.3 1.9 1.5 1.6
Gross fixed capital formation  2.3 4.8 3.9 4.2
Net exports
a) – 0.2  0.2  – 0.1  0.0
Consumer prices
b) 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.8
   Percentage of nominal gross domestic product 
Government financial balance
c) – 2.4  – 2.0  – 1.5  – 1.3
   Percentage of employees 
Unemployment rate
d) 8.6 7.8 7.6 7.4
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous year). – 
b) Harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). –
c) 2006, 2007 and 2008: forecast of the European Commission. 
d) Standardised. 
Source: Eurostat; 2006, 2007 and 2008: forecasts by the EEAG. Appendix 2:
Ifo World Economic Survey (WES)
The Ifo World Economic Survey (WES) assesses
worldwide economic trends by polling transnational
as well as national organisations worldwide on cur-
rent economic developments in their respective coun-
tries. This allows for a rapid, up-to-date assessment of
the economic situation prevailing around the world.
In 2006, approximately 1000 economic experts in
90 countries were polled. WES is conducted in coop-
eration with the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) in Paris and receives financial support from the
European Commission. The survey questionnaire
focuses on qualitative information: assessments of a
country’s general economic situation at present and
expectations regarding important economic indica-
tors by the end of the next six months. It has proved
to be a useful tool, since it reveals economic changes
earlier than conventional business statistics. 
The individual replies are combined for each country
without weighting. The grading procedure consists in
giving a grade of 9 to positive replies (+), a grade of
5 to indifferent replies (=) and a grade of 1 to negative
(–) replies. Overall grades within the range of 5 to 9
indicate that positive answers prevail or that a major-
ity expects trends to strengthen, whereas grades with-
in the range of 1 to 5 reveal predominantly negative
replies or expectations of weakening trends. The sur-
vey results are published as aggregated data at the
national or country group level. The aggregation pro-
cedure is based on country classifications. Within
each country group or region, the country results are
weighted according to the share of the specific coun-
try’s exports and imports in total world trade.
In October 2006, the World Economic Climate – the
arithmetic mean of the present and expected judge-
ments of the economic situation – deteriorated some-
what for the second time in succession. The climate
indicator now stands at 104.7 (after 105.6 in July:
1995=100), which is still considerably above its long-
term average (1990–2005: 94.3). Similar to the July
survey, only the future economic outlook has been
slightly downgraded, whereas the assessment of the
current economic situation has further improved.
1. World economy: Present economic situation 
continues to improve
According to the October results, the index of the cur-
rent economic situation continued to improve and is
approaching the all-time high that was reached six
years ago, at the end of 2000. But, as economic expec-
tations – the second component of the economic cli-
mate index – have been again downgraded, the over-
all economic climate deteriorated somewhat. This
data constellation is typical for the late phase of an
upswing. 
The data mainly reflect business sentiments in the
US, Germany, China and Japan – countries that
account for more than 30 percent of total world
trade. In both Asian countries, the economic climate
improved relative to the July survey, with both its two
components – present economic situation and expec-
tations – pointing upward. Particularly China’s eco-
nomic weight in the world economy is strongly in-
creasing and has almost reached the weight of
Germany, measured by the share of imports and
exports in total world trade. The economic climate
index has risen somewhat also in the US. However,
while the present economic situation deteriorated
somewhat, according to the surveyed experts, the
economic expectations for the coming six months
have been upgraded, pointing to a moderate down-
turn in the near future. The German picture is com-
pletely different. Here the assessments of the present
economic situation are approaching the all-time high
of 2000. However, given the VAT (value added tax)
rise from 16 to 19 percent in 2007, the outlook signals
some economic cooling in the next six months.
For a global, medium-term forecast a look at the Ifo
Business Clock, which shows the development of the
two components of the economic climate index over
the last six years, visualises the trend. In the second
half of 2006, the economic climate index started to
approach a regular contraction phase. However, as
the economic environment remains favourable, with
strong Asian economies, moderate inflation rates and
stabilising or even falling interest rates, a soft landing
appears likely. 
2. Western Europe: Forecasts of economic slowing
The panel’s assessment of the current economic situa-
tion has followed a positive trend since July 2005 and
is now approaching the all-time high of 2000. How-
ever, the overall economic climate indicator slipped
slightly in October, due to less optimistic economic
expectations for the next six months in the majority of
the Western European countries.
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The assessment of the present economic situation
improved in almost all countries of the euro area,
except  Finland, where a very favourable level was
reached already in July 2006, and Greece, where the
present economic situation has stabilised at a satis-
factory level. The most positive assessments of the
current situation were made in Ireland, Finland, the
Netherlands, Austria, Spain, Belgium and Germany.
While in the other countries of the euro area the pre-
sent economic performance was assessed close to or
above the satisfactory level, it remained un-
favourable in Portugal. However, the economic
expectations for Portugal are highly optimistic for
the first half of 2007. Austria and Greece were the
only countries in the euro area, where the outlook
for the coming six months has brightened over the
July survey. In all the other countries of the euro
area, economic expectations have been downgraded
somewhat, particularly in Germany, Ireland, Italy
and the Netherlands.
In the Nordic countries outside the euro area –
Denmark, Norway and Sweden – the economic climate
remains highly favourable. In Denmark and Norway,
the present economic situation has been given the
highest possible marks on the WES scale and the out-
look for the first half of 2007 promises further
strengthening of the economy. In both countries, the
surveyed economists stated that shortages of skilled
labour is the most important economic problem at
present. It also ranks second, after unemployment, in
Sweden, where the present economic situation is also
assessed very favourably. Expectations point to fur-
ther improvement.
In the UK, the surveyed economists forecast a deteri-
oration of the economic situation in the coming six
months from the currently favourable level. A similar
forecast has been given by the surveyed experts in
Switzerland. 
Along with unemployment, lack of international com-
petitiveness is ranked as an important economic prob-
lem in the majority of the Western European coun-
tries, particularly in Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Sweden
and the UK.
3. North America: US economy cools at a slower
pace
According to the latest survey results, the economic
climate indicator in North America deteriorated
only slightly in the October survey. In the US, the
decline was mainly due to less favourable assess-
ments of the present economic situation, while
expectations for the next six months are still slightly
negative. Expectations have, however, been upgraded
somewhat. Oil prices have declined, inflation
remains stable and fewer WES experts expect rising
interest rates. This data constellation points to a soft
landing of the US economy and eases the fears of
stagflation. However, the WES experts again report-
ed the public deficits to be the most important eco-
nomic problem at present.
Also in Canada, business sentiments continued to
cool, although at a stronger pace than in the US. Both
components of the climate index have been strongly
downgraded. However, the present economic perfor-
mance is still assessed with very high marks and short-
ages of skilled labour are regarded as a main impedi-
ment to further growth.
4. Eastern Europe: Economic climate remains 
satisfactory
Since the beginning of 2005, the economies in Eastern
Europe have been on a stable course. This positive
trend continued also in 2006. According to the
October WES results, business sentiments in the
region remained very positive. The overall economic
climate stabilised at a satisfactory level, with both the
assessments of the current economic situation and
expectations for the coming six months remaining
favourable. However, the countries of the region are
exposed to a variety of economic problems in the
opinion of respondents: Government deficits, lack of
confidence in governments’ economic policy and unem-
ployment have been named most often by the sur-
veyed economists as important economic problems at
present.
Among the EU countries, the assessment of the pre-
sent economic situation improved in Bulgaria,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia and the Slovak
Republic, and deteriorated somewhat in the Czech
Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. However,
the current economic situation is assessed as above
the satisfactory level in all these countries except
Hungary. Here, government deficits and a lack of
confidence in the government’s economic policy have
been named as the most important economic prob-
lems of the country. In the Baltic countries – Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania – the experts classified lack ofskilled labour as the most important impediment to
stronger growth. In Poland and the Slovak Republic,
unemployment is seen as the most important econom-
ic problem. In the majority of the Eastern European
EU countries, economic expectations remained posi-
tive and have been downgraded only slightly in the
Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia, while they
become strongly pessimistic in Hungary. 
In the other Eastern European countries, economic
trends observed in October are different. The present
economic performance has been assessed more posi-
tively than in the July survey in Albania and Croatia.
The majority of surveyed economists in Albania and
Croatia forecast that the current favourable situation
will persist. Serbia and Montenegro are now separat-
ed, as Montenegro proclaimed its independence in
June 2006. As no separate economic data are thus far
available, the two countries are again reported togeth-
er. The assessment of the present economic situation
improved somewhat for the two countries, but
remained below the satisfactory level. However, the
surveyed economists expect an economic rebound in
the region. 
5. CIS: Highly favourable economic climate
The economic climate remained highly favourable
in the CIS countries covered by WES (Russia,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine) in October. This holds
true particularly for Russia and Kazakhstan, where
the present economic performance is assessed with
highly favourable marks and expectations promise
further economic strengthening in the first half of
2007. In the Ukraine, the assessment of the current
economic situation has not yet reached the satisfac-
tory level. According to WES experts, the country’s
sluggish economic growth translates into a lack of
confidence in the government’s economic policy.
However, the outlook for the coming six months has
brightened somewhat. In all three surveyed CIS
countries, the WES experts emphasised lack of inter-
national competitiveness as one of the most impor-
tant economic problems. In Kazakhstan, shortages
of skilled labour and inflation are also regarded as
problematic. 
6. Asia: Economic climate improves
In October, the economic climate index in Asia
improved, after it had deteriorated twice, first in April
and then in July 2006. The improvement resulted from
both more favourable assessments of the present eco-
nomic situation and upgraded economic expectations
for the coming six months. 
The above pattern could also be observed in six
economies of the region, including the main
economies – Japan, China and India – as well as
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. The overall
economic situation is assessed as very favourable in
all these countries, except Thailand, where the assess-
ment has not yet reached the satisfactory level. The
forecasts for the next six months are very optimistic
in all countries mentioned above, except Malaysia,
where the surveyed economists expect a cooling-
down of the economy. The current economic perfor-
mance was assessed as below the satisfactory level
only in Indonesia, Thailand and Taiwan. However,
while in Indonesia and Thailand the economic expec-
tations are very positive, in Taiwan – Asia’s sixth-
largest economy – the surveyed economists expect
further economic deterioration. WES experts also
forecast slowing exports that may hurt the economy,
which is already strained by low consumer spending
and corruption accusations against President Chen
Shui-bian. 
Lack of confidence in the government’s economic pol-
icy is seen as a problem in Taiwan and several other
countries in the region, for example, the Philippines,
Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The expectations
for the next six months have been downgraded
somewhat also in Bangladesh, and to a stronger
degree in South Korea and Singapore. However, in
Singapore and Bangladesh, the present economic
performance is assessed as very positive, and in
South Korea as satisfactory. The assessments of the
present economic situation remained positive in
Vietnam and Pakistan. In both countries, the panel’s
forecasts for the next six months remained highly
optimistic. In Hong Kong the assessment of the cur-
rent economic situation improved over the previous
July survey and is now clearly above the satisfacto-
ry level. The economic expectations, however,
remained cautious. In Sri Lanka the present eco-
nomic situation is expected to stabilise at the cur-
rent satisfactory level. 
While the rest of the world is struggling to remain
competitive with Asian products, there are several
countries in the region where the surveyed economists
reported lack of international competitiveness as one
of the most important economic problems. Among
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them are Taiwan, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines
and Malaysia. The WES experts in the three biggest
economies of the region – China, India and Japan –
are less worried about their countries’ international
competitiveness. While in China,  unemployment still
ranks as the most important economic problem, in the
other two economies the economists instead empha-
sised government budget deficits.
7. Oceania: Economic stabilisation
In Australia, the economic expectations for the com-
ing six months have again improved somewhat. The
assessment of the present economic situation contin-
ued to deteriorate slightly but remained above the sat-
isfactory level. As a result, the overall economic cli-
mate index has even improved somewhat relative to
the previous survey of July 2006. Inflation has
increasingly become an important economic problem.
As a result Australia’s central bank has over time
raised its benchmark interest rate to 6.25 percent in
November last year, reaching the highest level in
almost six years.
In  New Zealand, the economic climate index
improved for the second time in succession since the
beginning of 2005. Although the assessment of the
current economic situation remained slightly below
the satisfactory level, economic expectations have
been strongly upgraded, suggesting that the trough of
the recent recession has been overcome and an eco-
nomic rebound is underway. In both economies, the
surveyed economists stated shortages of skilled
labour to be the most important economic problem at
present. 
8. Latin America: Economic stabilisation continues
The economic climate in Latin America continued to
stabilise at a favourable level in October. On average,
the present economic situation is again assessed above
the satisfactory level for all countries surveyed in the
region. The outlook for the coming six months,
although slightly downgraded, points to an economic
stabilisation. However, unemployment is still regarded
as the most important economic problem in the
majority of countries on the continent, whereas lack
of international competitiveness ranks second. 
The present economic situation has been assessed as
positive in almost all countries in the region, except
Ecuador and Paraguay. While in Paraguay the eco-
nomic outlook for the next six months points to an
improvement, in Ecuador the panel’s forecasts have
been downgraded and point to a further economic
cooling-down of the economy. In Mexico, both com-
ponents of the economic climate index remained
positive in October. The overall pattern indicates
that the satisfactory economic performance will sta-
bilise at its present level in the course of the next six
months. In July, the country experienced some polit-
ical turbulence because the second-place candidate
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador in the presidential
elections was challenging the results in court.
However, in October the surveyed economists indi-
cated that there is no lack of confidence in President’s
Felipe Calderon economic policy. Instead the lack of
international competitiveness and unemployment are
seen as the most important economic problems. In
the other two large economies of the region –
Argentina and Brazil – both the assessments of the
present economic situation as well as economic
expectations deteriorated. Nevertheless, the present
economic performance is still assessed as satisfacto-
ry and expectations point to robust growth in these
countries in the first half of 2007.
The current economic situation has again been
assessed as highly favourable in Chile, although to a
lesser degree then in the previous July survey.
However, the economic expectations point to robust
growth in the coming six months. A similar pattern
of business sentiments was observed in October in
Colombia. In both countries unemployment is
ranked as the economic problem number one.
Highly favourable current economic performance
was reported by the surveyed economists in Peru.
The economic expectations for the next six months,
although slightly downgraded, remained highly
optimistic.  Uruguay, Guatemala, Trinidad and
Tobago, El Salvador and Costa Rica received very
positive assessments of the present economic situa-
tion. In all these countries, economic expectations
point either to an improvement or to a continuation
of the current situation in the first half of 2007. In
contrast, the surveyed economists in Venezuela
expect a deterioration of the buoyant economy in
the coming six months. The surveyed experts report-
ed a strong lack of confidence in the government’s
economic policy, which seems to burden also the
economies of Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador. In
Bolivia, the present economic situation was assessed
as satisfactory, but the panel’s forecast has become
less optimistic than in the July survey. 9. Near East: Economic climate cools
The economic climate continues to be highly
favourable in the majority of the Near East countries.
However, both the assessments of the present eco-
nomic situation and economic expectations have been
slightly downgraded relative to the preceding July sur-
vey. This picture was particularly prevalent in Leba-
non, reflecting the impact of the Israeli-Hezbollah
conflict on the country’s economy. 
The economic climate cooled somewhat in the two
major oil-exporting countries, Saudi Arabia and
United Arab Emirates. However, the present econom-
ic situation is still assessed as favourable. The outlook
suggests stable economic development in the coming
six months. In the other oil-exporting countries –
Kuwait, Jordan and Bahrain – the economic climate
index improved. Both the present economic situation
as well as economic expectations have been assessed
to be at a very high level. In Iran, current economic
performance is regarded as satisfactory, but the fore-
casts for the next six months continue to point to dete-
rioration. Here the surveyed economists reported that
inflation is increasingly becoming an economic prob-
lem. In Turkey, business sentiments have cooled in
2006. However, the present economic situation is
assessed as above the satisfactory level, and economic
expectations point to stabilisation in the course of the
first half of 2007. In Israel, surveyed economists fore-
cast an economic revival in the next six months. Both
capital expenditures as well as private consumption
are expected to rebound in 2007. Although the assess-
ments of the present economic situation have been
downgraded somewhat, they are still in positive terri-
tory. In the majority of the surveyed countries in the
region, unemployment is ranked as the most important
economic problem at present. 
10. Africa: Economic climate deteriorates
Due to the diversity of economic trends on this conti-
nent and due to the fact that only eight African coun-
tries were surveyed by WES in October, an aggregate
climate index for Africa makes little sense. The eco-
nomic climate index deteriorated particularly in South
Africa, which has been enjoying its longest economic
expansion ever. The assessments of both the present
and the future economic situation have been strongly
downgraded by the surveyed economists. South
Africa’s AIDS epidemic, high unemployment of low-
skilled workers and at the same time shortages of
skilled labour continue to be the most persistent eco-
nomic problems in the country. The economic climate
deteriorated in the majority of the surveyed countries
in the region: this was the case in the North African
countries of Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia, but also in
Nigeria and Mauritius. However, while in Morocco
and Tunisia the surveyed experts assessed the present
economic situation as satisfactory and expect un-
changed conditions in the near-term future, the
assessments of the present economic state have again
fallen below the satisfactory level in Egypt and
Nigeria. According to the poll’s forecast, though, the
two latter economies will rebound in 2007. In Egypt
the surveyed economists continue to count on the
export sector. In Algeria, the business climate
remained favourable. This was not so in Zimbabwe,
where the economic situation remains unbelievably
bad since almost a decade, with no turnaround in
sight. 
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